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Articles
SOMEBODY’S WATCHING ME:
FCPA MONITORSHIPS AND HOW THEY CAN
WORK BETTER
F. Joseph Warin*
Michael S. Diamant
Veronica S. Root
Few penalties imposed on a corporate criminal offender cause as
much consternation as do compliance monitors. After the late-night crisis
management meetings, after the invasive and expensive internal
investigation, after the shakeup of senior managers, and after the protracted
negotiations with federal authorities, companies just want to get back to
business. They want to sell their goods and services, be profitable, invest,
and grow. In short, they want to move on. Fundamentally, the corporate
compliance monitor stands in the way of forgetting the past and going back
to ―business as usual‖—at least when it comes to obeying the law. The
monitor‘s purpose is to see that the company follows applicable laws and
regulations going forward and institutes the proper policies and procedures
to help ensure compliance. Corporations will never welcome this ―tail‖ to
their criminal prosecutions. Monitorships inevitably involve significant
expenditures of funds and time. Indeed, the Government Accountability
Office reported to Congress in November 2009 that corporations have
expressed concern about ―how monitors were carrying out their
responsibilities‖ and ―the overall cost of the monitorship.‖1 By taking the
* Mr. Warin is a partner, and Mr. Diamant and Ms. Root are associates at Gibson,
Dunn & Crutcher LLP in Washington, D.C. Mr. Warin and Mr. Diamant advise major
corporations regarding their FCPA compliance monitorships. Mr. Warin served as the
FCPA compliance monitor for Statoil ASA and currently serves as the FCPA compliance
monitor for Alliance One International, Inc., and as U.S. counsel to the monitor for Siemens
AG.
1. Prosecutors Adhered to Guidance but DOJ Could Better Communicate: Hearing
Before the Subcomm. on Commercial and Admin. Law of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary,
111th Cong. 11 (2009) [hereinafter Larence Testimony] (statement of Eileen R. Larence,
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right steps, however, companies can often help tailor and guide the
monitorships they receive to help ensure that the organization realizes
value.
This article explores the rise of the corporate compliance monitor as a
condition for settling violations of the U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act
(―FCPA‖)—a setting in which federal prosecutors routinely impose
monitors. From 2004 to 2010, more than 40 percent of all companies that
resolved an FCPA investigation with the U.S. Department of Justice
(―DOJ‖) or Securities and Exchange Commission (―SEC‖) through a
settlement or plea agreement retained an independent compliance monitor
as a condition of that agreement.2 And although the trend line is somewhat
unclear, this practice seems unlikely to abate. In 2007, almost 38% of
corporate FCPA settlements entailed monitors; 60% in 2008; 18% in 2009;
and 32% in 2010.3
If U.S. enforcement authorities maintain their current approach, the
reality is that companies facing liability for violating the FCPA are likely to
have a monitor imposed on them as part of a settlement agreement. From
the U.S. government‘s perspective, monitorships make sense for companies
that violate anti-bribery laws, making it important for offending
corporations to learn how to deal with monitors. Pulling from the authors‘
extensive experience with three major FCPA compliance monitorships, as
well as their work assisting clients operating under an FCPA monitorship,
this article aids in that process. It also hopes to help monitors themselves,
as well as the prosecutors who appoint them, in making the monitorship a
more constructive feature of an FCPA settlement. Part I provides some
basic background on the FCPA and discusses the use of compliance
monitors as a term in settlement agreements with federal regulators. Part II
examines why some companies receive a monitor as a term of an FCPA
settlement, while others do not. Part III discusses what FCPA monitorships
most commonly entail. Part IV identifies best practices for FCPA
compliance monitors: what they should and should not do in their quest to
help mold an ethical organization. Finally, Part V advises how companies
can utilize their role in the selection, retention, and management of the
Director, Homeland Security and Justice, Government Accountability Office), available at
http://judiciary.house.gov/hearings/pdf/ Larence091119.pdf.
2. Monitors are referred to by various names, including independent consultant,
independent compliance consultant, compliance consultant, compliance counsel, outside
compliance consultant, etc. Despite the various names, these individuals all, at a minimum,
act to independently monitor a corporation and its adherence to the FCPA.
3. Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher LLP, Internal Statistical Analysis (2010) (on file with
authors).
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monitor to help make the process anodyne and the results valuable for the
organization.
I.

FCPA ENFORCEMENT AND THE COMPLIANCE MONITOR AS A
CONDITION OF SETTLEMENT

Before delving into the details of FCPA compliance monitorships, it is
helpful to consider briefly the FCPA and its enforcement, more generally,
as well as recent FCPA enforcement actions that have featured a monitor.
A.

The FCPA and its Enforcement

In 1977, following revelations about the corrupt activities of major
U.S. corporations overseas, Congress passed the FCPA, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m
and 78dd-1 et seq.4 At the heart of the statute are its anti-bribery
provisions, which prohibit giving or offering anything of value5 to a foreign
official,6 political party, or party official with the corrupt intent to influence
the recipient in his or her official capacity or to secure an improper
4. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m, 78dd-1, et seq. (2006).
5. The phrase ―anything of value‖ encompasses a broad range of items and can include
anything a recipient would find interesting or useful, including theater tickets, gifts, stock,
travel, education, employment, donations, and illicit items. See, e.g., United States v.
Kozeny, 582 F. Supp. 2d 535, 538 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (discussing that bribes ―in any form
whatsoever‖ are within the scope of the prohibition); United States v. ABB Vetco Gray,
Inc., No. 04-cr-00279, slip op. at 6-17 (S.D. Tex. June 22, 2004) (detailing the extensive
bribery scheme that the defendant engaged in with Nigerian governmental oil officials);
Deferred Prosecution Agreement at Attachment A § IV(B), United States v. Daimler AG,
No. 1:10-cr-00063 (D.D.C. Mar. 22, 2010), available at http://www.law.virginia.edu/pdf/
faculty/garrett/daimler.pdf [hereinafter Daimler Deferred Prosecution Agreement] (detailing
the broad range of bribes employed by Daimler in China); Letter from Mark F. Mendelsohn,
Deputy Chief, U.S. Dep‘t of Justice, to Martin J. Weinstein, Willkie Farr & Gallagher LLP,
at app. A, Statement of Facts 8 (Nov. 14, 2007), available at http://www.justice.gov/
criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/docs/11-14-07lucent-agree.pdf [hereinafter Lucent Technologies
Inc. Non-Prosecution Agreement] (detailing the broad range of Lucent‘s bribes to Chinese
government officials, including payments covering tuition and living expenses of an
employee of a Chinese government ministry, who was obtaining a master‘s degree).
6. The U.S. government defines ―foreign official‖ broadly and includes any officer or
employee, including low-level employees and officials, of a foreign government or any
department, agency, or instrumentality of the government. See U.S. Dep‘t of Justice, LayPerson’s Guide to FCPA, available at http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/docs/laypersons-guide.pdf (detailing anti-bribery provisions of the FCPA). The statute also includes
as ―foreign officials‖ officers and employees of public international organizations, such as
the United Nations, the International Monetary Fund, and the Red Cross. See Ex. Ord. No.
12643, June 23, 1988, 53 F.R. 24247 (conferring public international organization status
upon the International Committee of the Red Cross); Ex. Ord. No. 9751, July 11, 1946, 11
F.R. 7713 (conferring public international organization status upon the International
Monetary Fund); Ex. Ord. No. 9698, Feb. 19, 1946, 11 F.R. 1809 (conferring public
international organization status upon the United Nations).
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advantage in order to obtain or retain business.7 The anti-bribery
provisions apply to three categories of persons: (1) ―issuers‖8—any
company whose securities are registered in the United States or that is
required to file periodic reports with the SEC; (2) ―domestic concerns‖—
any individual who is a U.S. citizen, national, or resident of the United
States, or any business organization that has its principal place of business
in the United States or which is organized in the United States; and
(3) other persons who take any act in furtherance of a corrupt payment
while within the territory of the United States.9
The FCPA also contains two accounting provisions, which require
publicly traded companies to maintain (1) accurate ―books and records‖
and (2) reasonably effective internal controls.10 Under the books-andrecords provision, issuers must ―make and keep books, records, and
accounts, which, in reasonable detail, accurately and fairly reflect
transactions and dispositions of the assets‖ consistent with Generally
Accepted Accounting Principles.11 The books-and-records provision
applies to all transactions, not just corrupt activities. Under the internal
controls provision, issuers must implement and maintain a system of
internal accounting controls that ―provide reasonable assurances‖ that no
off-book accounts or disbursements or other unauthorized payments are
made.12
The FCPA does permit some payments that otherwise satisfy its
elements. It provides an exception for payments that facilitate or expedite
some routine governmental actions.13 And it allows for two affirmative
defenses: (1) payments expressly permitted by the written laws of the host
country, and (2) ―[r]easonable and bona fide expenditure[s], such as travel
and lodging expenses . . . directly related to (A) the promotion,
demonstration, or explanation of products or services; or (B) the execution
of performance of a contract with a foreign government or agency
7. § 78dd-1(a).
8. If an issuer or domestic concern authorizes a third party (e.g., local agents,
consultants, attorneys, or subsidiaries) to make payments that the issuer or domestic concern
―knows‖ are corrupt, the issuer or domestic concern can be held liable under the FCPA.
Knowledge means either (1) being aware of such conduct or substantially certain that such
conduct will occur; or (2) consciously disregarding a ―high probability‖ that a corrupt
payment or offer will be made. See U.S. Dep‘t of Justice, supra note 6 (defining the five
elements that must be met to constitute a violation of the FCPA).
9. §§ 78dd-1, 78dd-2, & 78dd-3.
10. § 78m(b).
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id. at § 78dd-1(b).
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thereof.‖14 Much of the time and energy expended on FCPA compliance
by corporate lawyers today involves ensuring that benefits provided to
foreign officials safely fall under one of these affirmative defenses.15
That corporate counsel expends much time at all worrying about the
FCPA is a relatively recent phenomenon. Until the past decade, FCPA
enforcement was fairly dormant.
Years would pass without any
prosecutions. In fact, federal authorities brought only five enforcement
actions in 2004.16 But enforcement exploded in 2007, the statute‘s thirtieth
year, with thirty-eight enforcement actions.17 In 2009, this number grew to
forty, with the DOJ bringing twenty-six alone.18 The SEC and DOJ
combined for 137 enforcement actions over the past three years.19 Last
year, the SEC and DOJ broke all FCPA enforcement records, with the two
agencies combining for seventy-four enforcement actions.20
FCPA enforcement can result in criminal and/or civil liability. The
DOJ may bring criminal and civil enforcement actions against violators;
the SEC has civil authority only. If a corporation violates the anti-bribery
provisions, the criminal penalties include a $2 million fine or twice the
pecuniary gain or loss, and possible suspension and debarment by the U.S.
government.21 If a corporation violates the accounting provisions, it may
suffer a criminal penalty of up to $25 million, per violation.22 Civil
penalties may include fines and disgorgement of profits.23
Ultimately, however, these monetary penalties can pale in comparison
to the other difficulties (formal and collateral) that attend corporate FCPA
enforcement actions. Following the discovery of a potential FCPA
problem, the responsible company will conduct an internal investigation
and take appropriate remedial steps. This usually entails a significant
expenditure of money on attorneys‘ fees, the appropriation of employee
time, and even the permanent loss of employees who must be terminated
14. Id. at § 78dd-1(c).
15. F. Joseph Warin, Michael S. Diamant, Jill M. Pfenning, FCPA Compliance in
China and the Gifts and Hospitality Challenge, 5 VA. L. & BUS. REV. 33, 61-70 (2010).
16. See Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher LLP, 2010 Year-End FCPA Update (Jan. 3, 2011),
available
at
http://www.gibsondunn.com/publications/pages/2010Year-EndFCPA
Update.aspx (tracking the number of FCPA enforcement actions brought by the FCPA‘s
enforcers during the past seven years).
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. See id. (noting that ―it is clear that 2010 will go down as yet another landmark year
for FCPA enforcement.‖). The statistics in this paragraph include enforcement actions
brought against individuals as well as corporations.
21. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-2(g)(1) (2006); 18 U.S.C. § 3571(d) (2006).
22. 15 U.S.C. § 78ff(a).
23. §§ 78u(d), 78dd-2(g), 78dd-3(e). Disgorgement can be a significant penalty, with
companies like Siemens AG and Daimler AG disgorging $350 million and $91.4 million,
respectively, to settle their FCPA actions. Infra note 86; infra note 53.
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for improper behavior. Once the scandal becomes public, other collateral
consequences may include a decline in reputation or goodwill, a drop in
stock price, lawsuits by investors or others, suspension or debarment from
government contracting, and various tax law problems.
The consequence on which this article focuses, the corporate
compliance monitor, is one of the greatest challenges that may accompany
an FCPA enforcement action. Imposed as a condition of the settlement, the
monitor siphons both financial and human resources, while increasing the
probability that another corruption problem could be uncovered and the
parade of collateral consequences could resume. It is, therefore, little
wonder that corporations wish to avoid monitors.
B.

Monitorships as Part of FCPA Settlements

It is unsurprising that the government frequently imposes independent
compliance monitors as a term of an FCPA settlement. As some observers
have noted, foreign bribery cases tend to involve a culture of corruption,
trigger individual rationalizations or deflection of responsibility, and
implicate an entire organization‘s ―social architecture‖ and incentive
system.24 In other words, FCPA transgressions may reveal systemic
problems at an organization. This is why compliance professionals
typically point to a ―culture of compliance‖ as the most effective tool for
combating corporate corruption.25
A federal prosecutor turning to the DOJ‘s McNulty Memorandum for
guidance on how to handle a corporate offender is advised that ―the
government [should] address and be a force for positive change of
corporate culture [and] alter corporate behavior,‖26 while the SEC‘s
Seaboard Report advises securities enforcement officials to consider
whether ―a tone of lawlessness [was] set by those in control of the
company.‖27 Concepts like ―tone‖ and ―culture,‖ as important as they may
24. See David Hess and Cristie Ford, Corporate Corruption and Reform Undertakings:
A New Approach to an Old Problem, 41 CORNELL INT‘L L.J. 307, 322 (2008) (arguing that
requiring corporations merely to adopt a compliance program and stronger internal controls
may be insufficient).
25. See H. Lowell Brown, Parent-Subsidiary Liability under the Foreign Corrupt
Practices Act, 50 BAYLOR L. REV. 1, 39-52 (1998) (arguing that an effective culture of
compliance requires formal policies, awareness throughout the corporation, ex-ante
vigilance, and ex-post remedies).
26. See Memorandum from Paul J. McNulty, Deputy Attorney General, U.S. Dep‘t of
Justice, to Heads of Department Components and U.S. Attorneys (Dec. 12, 2006), available
at http://www.usdoj.gov/dag/speeches/2006/mcnulty_memo.pdf.
27. Report of Investigation Pursuant to Section 21(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of
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be, are often hard to quantify and harder still to ensure through even very
good policies and procedures. Corporate culture is inherently organic, and
altering it requires time before reforms take root and permeate the
organization. Therefore, in addition to demanding appropriate remedial
actions, prosecutors trying to ensure that a corporate defendant sets a
compliant tone within the organization and changes its culture will
undoubtedly see a ―tail‖ to a settlement in the form of a monitor as a useful
tool. During the years that follow the settlement, the monitor can help
ensure that the corporation‘s leaders continue to sound the right ―tone from
the top‖ and take the steps necessary to infuse the corporation with high
standards of ethical behavior. Occasionally, corporations use the presence
of an FCPA monitor as an opportunity for effecting significant change. As
the DOJ‘s Morford Memorandum notes, effective monitorships help to
―reduce[] recidivism of corporate crime and . . . protect[] the integrity of
the marketplace.‖28
A second reason why monitorships may be particularly attractive in
the FCPA context is that overseas bribery often results from the
environments in which companies operate, rather than representing a
conscious decision by employees to gain a leg up on competitors.29
Frequently, businesspeople complain that it is ―impossible‖ to do business

1934 and Commission Statement on the Relationship of Cooperation to Agency
Enforcement Decisions, Exchange Act Release No. 1470, Accounting and Auditing
Enforcement Release No. 1470 (Oct. 23, 2001), available at http://www.sec.gov/
litigation/investreport/34-44969.htm.
28. Memorandum from Craig S. Morford, Acting Deputy Att‘y Gen., to Heads of
Department Components and United States Attorneys (Mar. 7, 2008), available at
http://www.justice.gov/dag/morford-useofmonitorsmemo-03072008.pdf
[hereinafter
Morford Memo]. See also Transparency and Integrity in Corporate Monitoring: Hearing
Before the Subcomm. on Commercial and Admin. Law of the H. Committee on the Judiciary,
111th Cong. (2009) (statement of Rep. Trent Franks), available at
http://judiciary.house.gov/hearings/printers/111th/111-64_53640.pdf (stating that deferred
prosecution agreements serve to rehabilitate the company, root out illegal and unethical
conduct, discipline culpable employees, help promote good corporate citizenship going
forward, and allow prosecutors to achieve more than they could through court-imposed fines
and restrictions alone).
29. See, e.g., Jose Armando Fanjul, Corporate Corruption in Latin America:
Acceptance, Bribery, Compliance, Denial, Economics, and the Foreign Corrupt Practices
Act, 26 PENN. ST. INT‘L L. REV. 735-36, n.5 (2007-2008) (―Corruption is far from being a
novelty. Its practice is as ancient as other social phenomena like prostitution and
contraband.‖ (quoting INSTITUTE OF LATIN AMERICAN STUDIES, POLITICAL CORRUPTION IN
EUROPE AND LATIN AMERICA 2 (1996)) (internal quotation marks omitted)); Patricia A.
Butenis, Ambassador, Bangl., Remarks at the Conference on Good Governance (June 25,
2006), available at http://dhaka.usembassy.gov/06.25.06_good_governance.html (―The
private sector needs to play a more active role in stemming the supply side of corruption. I
understand that most businesses look at corruption as a necessary evil. Some have told us
that they just account for it on their books—as much as 10%—as a cost of doing business.‖).
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in certain countries without paying bribes.30 Because overseas bribery is so
often a response to a ―shakedown‖ rather than an aggressive business
maneuver, one would expect backsliding to be more common following an
FCPA problem than other white collar crimes. Again, the ―tail‖ that is the
compliance monitorship makes this less likely.
FCPA monitorships may attend different types of settlements with the
U.S. authorities. For SEC enforcement, the monitorship is usually a term
of an administrative settlement or a final judgment entered by a court.31
The DOJ usually includes the monitorship as a term in a deferred
prosecution agreement (―DPA‖) or a non-prosecution agreement (―NPA‖),
but monitorships have also been part of plea agreements.32 From 2004
through 2010, seventy-one companies resolved FCPA allegations by
entering into one or more of these resolutions with the DOJ or SEC. Of
these seventy-one companies thirty, or 42.25%, were required to retain a
monitor as part of the resolution. This is a significant percentage,
especially when one considers, as a point of comparison, that from 1993
through September 2009, DOJ prosecutors negotiated a total of 152 DPAs
and NPAs—FCPA-related and otherwise—and forty-eight, or slightly more
than 30%, required the imposition of a monitor.33
In 2010, twenty-two corporations settled FCPA-related enforcement
30. Indeed, corporate actions in some highly corrupt countries support this contention.
For instance, Panalpina withdrew from Nigeria following U.S. government inquiries there.
Panalpina, Smooth Withdrawal from Nigeria, (Oct. 10, 2008), available at
http://www.panalpina.com/www/global/en/media_news/news/news_archiv_ordner/08_10_0
9.html. And Ikea very publicly froze any additional development in Russia due to public
corruption in that country. Andrew E. Kramer, Ikea Plans to Halt Investment in Russia,
N.Y. TIMES, June 23, 2009, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/06/24/business/
global/24ruble.html.
31. See, e.g., SEC v. Con-Way Int‘l, Inc., No. 08-cv-01478 (D.D.C. Aug. 27, 2008),
available at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/complaints/2008/comp20690.pdf; Cease-andDesist Order, In re Con-Way Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 58433, Accounting and
Auditing Enforcement Release No. 2867 (Aug. 27, 2008), available at
http://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/2008/34-58433.pdf.
32. See, e.g., Criminal Plea Agreement, United States v. Latin Node, Inc., No. 09-cr20239 (S.D. Fla. 2009), available at http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/docs/
latinnode-plea-agree.pdf (providing that the Department of Justice will be given access to all
of the corporation‘s officers, employees, and records relating to the illegal activities
charged); Letter from Steven A. Tyrrell, Chief, Dep‘t of Justice, to Nathan J. Muyskens,
Shook Hardy & Bacon L.L.P. (Sept. 29, 2009), available at http://www.law.virginia.edu/
pdf/faculty/garrett/agco.pdf (implementing a compliance and ethics program designed to
detect and prevent FCPA violations, as part of defendant corporation‘s plea agreement);
Letter from Steven A. Tyrrell, Chief, Dep‘t of Justice, to Leo Cunningham, Wilson Sonsini
Goodrich & Rosati (Dec. 31, 2009).
33. Larence Testimony, supra note 1, at 3.
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actions with the SEC and/or DOJ. Of these, seven retained independent
corporate monitors as a condition of settlement:
BAE SYSTEMS PLC (―BAES‖) – From 2000 to 2002, BAES
represented to various U.S. government agencies that it would create and
implement procedures designed to ensure the company‘s compliance with
the FCPA.34 Allegedly, BAES knowingly and willfully failed to create
such procedures, made a series of substantial payments to shell companies
and third-party intermediaries, and regularly retained ―marketing advisors‖
to assist in securing sales of defense products.35 This was all allegedly
done without BAES properly scrutinizing the relationships to ensure that
wrongdoing did not occur.36 Various U.K. reporters discovered the alleged
wrongdoing, prompting an investigation by the United Kingdom‘s Serious
Fraud Office (―SFO‖) and eventually the DOJ.37 On March 1, 2010, BAES
pleaded guilty to conspiring to defraud the United States by impairing and
impeding its lawful functions and making false statements about the
company‘s FCPA compliance program, as well as other items.38 BAES
agreed to pay a criminal fine of $400 million and to retain an independent
compliance monitor for three years.39
INNOSPEC, INC. (―INNOSPEC‖) — From 2000 to 2003, Innospec‘s
Swiss subsidiary, Alcor, allegedly paid or promised to pay at least $4
million in kickbacks to the former Iraqi government as part of the United
Nations (―U.N.‖) Oil-for-Food Program (―OFFP‖) scandal.40 Alcor was
34. See Press Release, Dep‘t of Justice, BAE Systems PLC Pleads Guilty and Ordered
to Pay $400 Million Criminal Fine (Mar. 1, 2010), available at http://www.justice.gov/
opa/pr/2010/March/10-crm-209.html.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Press Release, Dep‘t of Justice, Innospec Inc. Pleads Guilty to FCPA Charges and
Defrauding the United Nations; Admits to Violating the U.S. Embargo Against Cuba (Mar.
18, 2010), available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2010/March/10-crm-278.html; SEC
Files Settled Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Charges Against Innospec, Inc. for Engaging in
Bribery in Iraq and Indonesia with Total Disgorgement and Criminal Fines of $40.2 Million,
Litigation Release No. 21454 (Mar. 18, 2010), available at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/
litreleases/2010/lr21454.htm. After Iraq invaded Kuwait in 1990, the United Nations
Security Council voted to enact a resolution prohibiting member states from trading in any
Iraqi commodities or products. Press Release, Dep‘t of Justice, Flowserve Corporation to
Pay $4 Million Penalty for Kickback Payments to the Iraqi Government Under the U.N. Oil
for Food Program (Feb. 21, 2008), available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2008/
February/08_crm_132.html. Subsequently, the U.N. authorized Iraq to sell oil on the
condition that the proceeds be deposited in a bank account monitored by the U.N. and used
only to purchase designated humanitarian goods to benefit the Iraqi people. Id. The OFFP
was subsequently established to administer Iraq‘s sale of oil and humanitarian goods
purchases. Id. The OFFP was intended to maximize the Iraqi government‘s flexibility in
meeting its humanitarian needs, while preventing it from undermining trade sanctions. Id.
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awarded five contracts valued at more than €40 million to sell tetraethyl
lead to refineries run by the Iraqi Ministry of Oil.41 Alcor allegedly inflated
the price by approximately 10% to cover the cost of the illegal payments
before submitting them to the U.N. for approval.42 Innospec also admitted
to selling chemicals to Cuban power plants, in violation of the U.S.
embargo against Cuba.43 On March 18, 2010, Innospec pleaded guilty to
the charges brought by the DOJ and entered into a settlement agreement
with the SEC.44 Innospec agreed to pay a $14.1 million criminal fine to the
DOJ and to retain an independent compliance monitor.45 In addition,
Innospec, without admitting or denying the SEC‘s allegations, consented to
the entry of a court order enjoining it from future violations and ordering it
to disgorge $60,071,613.46 The SEC, however, waived all but $11.2
million of the disgorgement.47 Innospec also paid a criminal fine of $12.7
million to the SFO and $2.2 million to the U.S. Department of Treasury‘s
Office of Foreign Assets Control.48
TECHNIP S.A. (―TECHNIP‖) — For a decade, Technip allegedly paid
Nigerian government officials bribes to obtain engineering, procurement,
and construction contracts.49 Technip won contracts to construct liquefied
natural gas facilities that were valued at more than $6 billion.50 On June
28, 2010, Technip entered into a DPA with the DOJ and agreed to pay a
$240 million criminal fine and to retain an independent compliance
In practice, however, the Iraqi government was able to circumvent the OFFP‘s restrictions
by demanding massive under-the-table payments from its contract partners. Id. Starting in
2000, each Iraqi ministry demanded a 10% ―after sales service fee‖ on all humanitarian
goods purchased under the OFFP. Id. The fee bore no relation to any actual services and
was, in reality, an illicit 10% kickback to the Iraqi regime. Id.
41. Press Release, Dep‘t of Justice, Innospec, supra note 40.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. SEC Files Settled Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Charges Against Innospec, supra
note 40.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Press Release, Dep‘t of Justice, Technip S.A. Resolves Foreign Corrupt Practices
Act Investigation and Agrees to Pay $240 Million Criminal Penalty (June 28, 2010),
available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2010/June/10-crm-751.html; SEC Charges
Technip with Foreign Bribery and Related Accounting Violations – Technip to Pay $98
Million in Disgorgement and Prejudgment Interest; Company Also to Pay a Criminal
Penalty of $240 Million, Litigation Release No. 21578, Accounting and Auditing
Enforcement Release No. 3147 (June 28, 2010), available at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/
litreleases/2010/lr21578.htm.
50. Id.
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monitor for two years.51 In addition, Technip—without admitting or
denying the SEC‘s allegations—entered into an agreement with the SEC,
was enjoined from violating portions of the Exchange Act, and disgorged
$98 million in profits.52
DAIMLER AG (―DAIMLER‖) — Daimler and three of its subsidiaries,
DaimlerChrysler Automotive Russia SAO (―DCAR‖), Export and Trade
Finance GmbH (―ETF‖), and DaimlerChrysler China Ltd. (―DCCL‖),
resolved allegations that they violated the FCPA.53 The U.S. government
alleged that Daimler engaged in a decade-long scheme of paying bribes to
foreign government officials to obtain contracts with government
customers for the purchase of Daimler vehicles.54 Daimler and its
subsidiaries allegedly made tens of millions of dollars in improper
payments in at least twenty-two countries.55 According to the court filings,
the improper payments were often recorded as commissions, special
discounts, or useful or necessary payments, which were understood as
euphemisms for ―bribes.‖56 Allegedly, the improper payments continued
after the DOJ began its investigation.57 DCAR and ETF pleaded guilty to
one count of conspiracy to violate the anti-bribery provisions of the FCPA
and one count of violating those provisions.58 Daimler and DCCL entered
into DPAs.59 In total, Daimler agreed to pay a criminal fine of $93.6
million to the DOJ, disgorge $91.4 million in profits, and retain an
independent compliance monitor for three years.60
ALLIANCE ONE INTERNATIONAL, INC. (―ALLIANCE ONE‖) —
Alliance One‘s predecessor companies allegedly made improper payments
in excess of $1.2 million to Thailand Tobacco Monopoly (―TTM‖) officials
between 2000 and 2004 to obtain more than $18.3 million in sales
contracts.61 In addition, one predecessor company allegedly paid monies to
Kyrgyz officials to induce the purchase of tobacco for resale and made
improper payments to certain tax officials to reduce tax penalties. A
different predecessor company allegedly provided improper gifts, travel,
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Press Release, Dep‘t of Justice, Daimler AG and Three Subsidiaries Resolve
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Investigation and Agree to Pay $93.6 Million in Criminal
Penalties (Apr. 1, 2010), available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2010/April/10-crm360.html; Press Release, SEC, SEC Charges Daimler AG with Global Bribery (Apr. 1,
2010), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2010/2010-51.htm.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Press Release, Dep‘t of Justice, supra note 53.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id.; Press Release, SEC, supra note 53.
61. See Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher LLP, 2010 Year-End FCPA Update, supra note 16.
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and entertainment to certain foreign officials. Alliance One entered into an
NPA with the DOJ, had foreign subsidiaries plead guilty to violating the
FCPA‘s anti-bribery and books-and-records provisions, and settled civil
anti-bribery, books-and-records, and internal controls charges with the
SEC. Alliance One paid $19.45 million to settle the matter and was
required to retain an independent compliance monitor for the three-year
term of its NPA.
UNIVERSAL CORPORATION (―UNIVERSAL‖) – Between 2000 and
2004, Universal allegedly paid approximately $800,000 to TTM officials to
obtain approximately $11.5 million in sales contracts for its Brazilian and
European subsidiaries.62 It also allegedly paid $165,000 to government
officials in Mozambique to secure an exclusive right to purchase tobacco
from regional growers and to influence the passage of favorable
legislation. Finally, Universal allegedly made improper payments totaling
$850,000 to high-ranking Malawian officials. Universal also entered into
an NPA with the DOJ, had foreign subsidiaries plead guilty to violating the
FCPA‘s anti-bribery and books-and-records provisions, and settled civil
anti-bribery, books-and-records, and internal controls charges with the
SEC. Universal paid $10 million to settle the matter and was required to
retain an independent compliance monitor for the three-year term of its
NPA.
ALCATEL-LUCENT, S.A. (―Alcatel-Lucent‖) — On December 27,
2010, Alcatel-Lucent settled with the DOJ and SEC, resolving allegations
of widespread bribery of foreign government officials.63 According to the
charging documents, from 2002 to 2006, prior to its merger with Lucent
Technologies, Inc., Alcatel S.A. used third-party agents to pay more than
$8 million in bribes to government officials in Costa Rica, Honduras,
Malaysia, and Taiwan in exchange for hundreds of millions of dollars
worth of public-sector telecommunications contracts. To resolve the SEC‘s
complaint, Alcatel-Lucent agreed to pay $45.4 million in disgorgement and
consented to an injunction from future violations of the anti-bribery, booksand-records, and internal controls provisions of the FCPA. To resolve the
criminal charges, Alcatel-Lucent consented to the filing of information
charging it with violating the books-and-records and internal controls
provisions, three of its subsidiaries pleaded guilty to FCPA conspiracy
counts, and the companies paid a combined criminal fine of $92 million.
The parent company‘s charges are stayed for the three-year term of a DPA.
Alcatel-Lucent also paid $10 million to settle corruption charges filed by
62. Id.
63. Id.
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Costa Rican authorities, the first time in Costa Rica‘s history that it has
recovered damages from a foreign corporation for corruption of its own
government officials. This case marks just the second time in the history of
the FCPA—the first being Siemens AG (―Siemens‖) in 2008—that a
company has resolved criminal internal controls charges.
Fifteen settlements did not require the retention of a compliance
monitor:
NATCO GROUP INC. (―NATCO‖) — In February and September of
2007, a NATCO subsidiary, TEST Automation & Controls, Inc. (―TEST‖),
allegedly made improper payments totaling approximately $45,000 to
Kazakh government officials.64 The bribes were paid in response to an
extortion threat.65 Kazakh immigration prosecutors had conducted audits
and claimed that TEST Kazakhstan‘s expatriate workers were working
without proper immigration documentation.66 The prosecutors threatened
the employees with fines, jail, or deportation if they did not pay cash
―fines.‖67 The employees capitulated and received reimbursement from
TEST, which documented the payments as advances on a ―bonus.‖68 In late
2007, NATCO discovered the payments during a routine internal audit
review. NATCO conducted an internal investigation and voluntarily
disclosed the matter to the SEC.69 Allegedly, the company‘s ―system of
internal accounting controls failed to ensure that TEST recorded the true
purpose of the payments.‖70 Without admitting or denying the allegations
in the SEC‘s complaint, NATCO consented to the entry of a cease and
desist order and agreed to pay a civil penalty of $65,000.71 The SEC
considered these remedial efforts when accepting NATCO‘s offer of
settlement.72
NEXUS TECHNOLOGIES, INC. (―NEXUS‖) — From 1999 to May 2008,
Nexus allegedly bribed foreign officials from Vietnam and Russia in an
attempt to induce them to influence decisions of their respective
governments and direct business to Nexus.73 The bribes were falsely
64. SEC Files Settled Action Charging NATCO Group Inc. with Violations of the
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, Litigation Release No. 21374, Accounting and Auditing
Enforcement Release No. 3102 (Jan. 11, 2010), available at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/
litreleases/2010/lr21374.htm.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Press Release, Nexus Technologies Inc. and Three Employees Plead Guilty to
Paying Bribes to Vietnamese Officials (Mar. 16, 2010), available at
http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2010/March/10-crm-270.html.

DIAMANT FINALIZED_ONE_UPDATED

334

U. OF PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW

3/22/2011 4:25 PM

[Vol. 13:2

described as ―commissions‖ in the company‘s records.74 As part of its
guilty plea, Nexus agreed to cease operations.75 On March 16, 2010, the
company pleaded guilty to the charges;76 on September 15, 2010, the
district court imposed the ―corporate death penalty‖ on Nexus, finding that
Nexus was a ―criminal purpose organization‖ under section 8C1.1 of the
U.S. Sentencing Guidelines and ordering a dissolution of the organization,
with all of its assets to be turned over to the court. Three Nexus employees
and one business partner were also prosecuted as part of this scandal, two
of whom received prison terms.
VERAZ NETWORKS, INC. (―VERAZ‖) — From 2007 to 2008, Veraz
employed a consultant in China who allegedly gave gifts and offered
improper payments to government officials, attempting to obtain business
for Veraz.77 The value of the gifts and payments was approximately
$40,000.78 During the same period, a Veraz employee made improper
payments to the CEO of a Vietnam government-controlled
telecommunications company.79 These improper payments were also given
in an attempt to obtain business for Veraz.80 The alleged misconduct was
discovered when Veraz conducted an internal investigation in response to
an SEC inquiry involving an unrelated issue.81 Veraz provided information
regarding the improper payments to the SEC.82 On June 29, 2010, without
admitting or denying the allegations in the SEC‘s complaint, Veraz
consented to the entry of a final judgment enjoining it from future
violations of portions of the Exchange Act and ordering it to pay a
$300,000 civil penalty.83
ENI S.P.A (―ENI‖) — Italian integrated energy company, ENI, and its
Dutch subsidiary, Snamprogetti Netherlands B.V. (―Snamprogetti‖), settled
FCPA charges stemming from alleged bribes paid by its joint venture to
senior Nigerian officials to obtain approximately $6 billion worth of
engineering, procurement, and construction contracts.84 ENI and
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. SEC Charges California Telecommunications Company with FCPA Violations,
Litigation Release No. 21581 (June 29, 2010), available at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/
litreleases/2010/lr21581.htm.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. See Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher LLP, 2010 Year-End FCPA Update (Jan. 3, 2011),
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Snamprogetti jointly consented to the entry of an injunction against future
FCPA violations and agreed to disgorge $125 million to the SEC.
Snamprogetti also entered into a DPA with the DOJ and agreed to pay a
$240 million criminal fine. This case is related to the above-discussed
Technip matter, which did involve the imposition of a monitor.
GENERAL ELECTRIC CO. (―GE‖) — On July 27, 2010, GE and two
companies that were acquired by GE after they allegedly committed
wrongdoing, Amersham plc and Ionics, Inc., settled civil charges alleging
violations of the FCPA‘s accounting provisions arising from the
participation of certain foreign subsidiaries in the OFFP.85 Without
admitting or denying the SEC‘s allegations, GE, Amersham, and Ionics
each consented to the entry of a permanent injunction against future
violations of the books-and-records and internal controls provisions of the
FCPA, GE paid a civil penalty of $1 million, and all three entities
collectively disgorged approximately $22.5 million in profits plus
prejudgment interest. GE‘s settlement is noteworthy among both OFFP
settlements and FCPA settlements more broadly for at least two reasons.
First, GE is the only company out of sixteen to settle OFFP-related charges
that has avoided criminal prosecution. Second, this settlement marks an
aggressive use of successor liability by the SEC, as GE was required to
disgorge allegedly illicit profits earned by businesses independent of GE at
the time of the wrongdoing.
MERCATOR CORP. (―MERCATOR‖) — On August 6, 2010, Mercator
pleaded guilty to one count of violating the FCPA‘s anti-bribery provisions
in connection with the 1999 gifting of two snowmobiles to senior officials
of the Republic of Kazakhstan.86 On November 19, 2010, the district court
sentenced Mercator to pay a $32,000 fine. This brought to an end one of
the longest-running investigations in the history of the FCPA.
ABB LTD. (―ABB‖) — On September 29, 2010, Swiss ADR-issuer
ABB resolved criminal and civil FCPA charges with the DOJ and SEC,
arising from two separate allegedly improper payment schemes.87 The first
involved six ABB subsidiaries based in Europe and the Middle East that
allegedly paid approximately $810,000 (and agreed to pay an additional
$240,000) to the Iraqi government in connection with thirty OFFP
contracts. The second, unrelated scheme concerned a U.S.-based
subsidiary of ABB that, between 1997 and 2004, allegedly paid
approximately $1.9 million through various intermediaries to officials of
state-owned utility companies in Mexico in exchange for approximately
$90 million in contracts. To resolve the criminal charges alleging
supra note 16.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id.
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conspiracies to violate the wire fraud statute and books-and-records
provision of the FCPA, ABB entered into a three-year DPA and agreed to
pay a criminal fine of $1.9 million. Additionally, ABB‘s U.S. subsidiary
pleaded guilty to violating and conspiring to violate the FCPA‘s antibribery provisions and paid a $17.1 million fine (down from the $28.5
million fine stipulated in the plea agreement, based on a finding by the
district court that the U.S. subsidiary was not, as the DOJ had claimed, a
recidivist violator of the FCPA). To settle civil charges with the SEC,
ABB consented to the entry of a permanent injunction prohibiting future
violations of the anti-bribery, books-and-records, and internal controls
provisions of the FCPA and paid more than $39.3 million in penalties,
disgorgement, and prejudgment interest.
RAE SYSTEMS INC. (―RAE‖) — Between 2004 and 2008, two of
RAE‘s majority-owned joint ventures in China provided their third-party
agents with cash advances generated through false or misleading invoices,
portions of which were passed on to Chinese officials.88 RAE allegedly
uncovered this practice during pre-acquisition due diligence for one of the
joint ventures, but failed to implement a system of internal controls
sufficient to stop the payments post-acquisition. With respect to the other
joint venture, RAE allegedly failed to conduct any FCPA due diligence in
connection with the transaction, and as a result, the company continued to
make improper payments following the acquisition. To resolve the
criminal allegations, RAE entered into an NPA with the DOJ, agreeing to
pay a $1.7 million fine. The DOJ cited RAE‘s substantial cooperation with
the investigation and its voluntary disclosure of the conduct as factors
relevant to the decision to resolve the matter with an NPA. With respect to
the SEC, RAE consented to the entry of a civil injunction against future
violations of the FCPA‘s accounting provisions and agreed to disgorge
approximately $1.1 million in allegedly ill-gotten profits, plus
approximately $100,000 in prejudgment interest.
The other seven 2010 corporate settlements were part of an industry
sweep of the global oil and oil services industry.89 Industry sweeps have
become a typical approach of the DOJ and SEC in recent years. The
companies involved were a global freight forwarder, PANALPINA WORLD
TRANSPORT (HOLDING), LTD. (―Panalpina‖), and six oil and oil service
firms (most of which were Panalpina customers), ROYAL DUTCH SHELL
PLC; TRANSOCEAN, INC. (―Transocean‖); TIDEWATER MARINE INT‘L, INC.;
PRIDE INT‘L INC.; NOBLE CORP.; and GLOBALSANTAFE CORP.
88. Id.
89. Id.

DIAMANT FINALIZED_ONE_UPDATED

3/22/2011 4:25 PM

2011] FCPA MONITORSHIPS AND HOW THEY CAN WORK BETTER

337

(―GlobalSantaFe‖). The origin of much of this investigation dates back to
February 2007, when three subsidiaries of global oil services company
Vetco International Ltd. resolved FCPA charges arising from improper
payments made on their behalf by Panalpina. In the wake of the Vetco
settlement, on July 2, 2007, the DOJ sent letters to eleven oil and oil
services companies, requesting information about their dealings with
Panalpina. With the exception of GlobalSantaFe (which merged with
Transocean in 2007, presumably making it subject to the terms of the
Transocean agreement) each of these companies entered into a DPA or
NPA with the DOJ and paid a substantial criminal fine. All seven
corporations involved consented to the filing of a civil complaint or
administrative action by the SEC and disgorged profits from the allegedly
improper conduct. These seven settlements resulted in more than $230
million in disgorgement, fines, and penalties.
II.

FACTORS INFLUENCING THE GOVERNMENT‘S DECISION TO REQUIRE
AN FCPA MONITOR

The settlements from 2010 demonstrate that it is hard to determine
from the factual recitation of any given case precisely what factors prove
dispositive in the government‘s desire for a compliance monitor as a
condition of settlement. If anything, an examination of the past half-decade
of FCPA settlements show that no single factor wholly determines whether
the DOJ or SEC will require a company to retain a monitor. Although
prosecutors consider a variety of issues,90 at least two factors emerge as
those most determinative of whether the FCPA settlement will include a
monitorship: (1) the degree of ingrained corruption at the corporation; and
(2) the existence of an effective corporate compliance program prior to the
offense. Companies with a more entrenched culture of corruption and
those lacking effective compliance programs seem most likely to receive
FCPA monitors, while the nature of the actual underlying offenses appears
to be a less important consideration.
A.

Culture of Corruption

The pervasiveness of corrupt activity within a corporation seems to
significantly affect whether or not it receives a compliance monitor. Past
settlement agreements indicate that prosecutors look at the corporate
90. See Cristie Ford & David Hess, Can Corporate Monitorships Improve Corporate
Compliance?, 34 J. CORP. L. 679, 698 (2009) (discussing multiple factors that are
considered when deciding whether to require a corporate monitor as part of a settlement
agreement); see also Morford Memo, supra note 28, at 2 (explaining that a ―monitor should
only be used where appropriate given the facts and circumstances of a particular matter‖).
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culture and consider whether it itself is ―corrupt‖ and in need of further
reform and monitoring. Indicators of such a pervasive culture include the
existence of widespread misconduct91 and whether wrongdoing is condoned
by the organization‘s upper management.92 This is in contrast to the
misconduct of a few rogue actors.93 In the latter situation, it appears that
prosecutors are much less likely to demand a monitor.
The quintessential example of pervasive corporate corruption is the
Siemens prosecution. Court filings alleged that Siemens made thousands
of corrupt payments to third parties in a manner contemplated to obscure
the purpose of the transactions and ultimate recipients of the money. 94 ―At
least 4,283 of those payments, totaling approximately $1.4 billion, were
used to bribe government officials in return for business to Siemens around

91. See, e.g., Press Release, Dep‘t of Justice, Transcript of Press Conference
Announcing Siemens AG and Three Subsidiaries Plead Guilty to Foreign Corrupt Practices
Act Violations (Dec. 15, 2008), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/pr/2008/December/
08-opa-1112.html (describing Siemens‘s conduct as ―egregious‖).
92. See, e.g., Deferred Prosecution Agreement, United States v. AGA Med. Corp., No.
0:08-cr-00172-1 (D. Minn. June 3, 2008) (alleging that a high-ranking officer and part
owner with power to set policy condoned violations). Interestingly, although this agreement
requires that AGA Medical Corporation engage a monitor by August 2, 2008, we
understand that, at least as of June 2010, no monitor has been approved. No public
explanation for the delay has been issued. In the fourth quarter of 2010, St. Jude Medical,
Inc., acquired AGA Medical Corporation, but relevant SEC filings do not indicate whether a
monitor has been appointed. See St. Jude Medical, Inc., Form S-4 (Oct. 20, 2010), available
at
http://sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/203077/000104746910008733/0001047469-10008733.txt.
93. See, e.g., Press Release, Dep‘t of Justice, Helmerich & Payne Agrees to Pay $1
Million Penalty to Resolve Allegations of Foreign Bribery in South America (July 30,
2009), available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2009/July/09-crm-741.html (discussing
the mitigating factors of Helmerich and Payne‘s voluntary disclosure and self-investigation,
which ultimately allowed it to settle without a monitor being imposed).
94. A collection of all of the most important court documents in the Siemens case is
located on Siemens‘s website as a compiled document. See Complaint at 2, SEC v. Siemens
Aktiengesellschaft, (D.D.C. Dec. 12, 2008) (No. 1:08-cv-02167), available at
http://www.siemens.com/press/pool/de/events/2008-12-PK/SEC.pdf [hereinafter Siemens
Complaint]; Final Judgment, SEC v. Siemens Aktiengesellschaft, (D.D.C. Dec. 12, 2008)
(No. 1:08-cv-02167), available at http://www.siemens.com/press/pool/de/events/2008-12PK/SEC.pdf [hereinafter Siemens Final Judgment]; Consent, SEC v. Siemens
Aktiengesellschaft, (D.D.C. Dec. 12, 2008) (No. 1:08-cv-02167), available at
http://www.siemens.com/press/pool/de/events/2008-12-PK/SEC.pdf [hereinafter Siemens
Consent]; Certificate of Corporate Resolution, SEC v. Siemens Aktiengesellschaft, (D.D.C.
Dec. 12, 2008) (No. 1:08-cv-02167), available at http://www.siemens.com/press/pool/
de/events/2008-12-PK/SEC.pdf; Civil Cover Sheet, SEC v. Siemens Aktiengesellschaft,
(D.D.C. Dec. 12, 2008) (No. 1:08-cv-02167), available at http://www.siemens.com/press/
pool/de/events/2008-12-PK/SEC.pdf.
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the world.‖95
Multiple corporate segments at Siemens, including
Communications, Industrial Solutions, Medical Solutions, Power
Generation, Power Transmission, and Transportation Systems, allegedly
engaged in bribery.96 To make matters worse, investigations in Italy and
other countries had alerted Siemens‘s top management well in advance to a
corruption problem; and yet, according to prosecutors, nothing was done to
bolster the company‘s internal compliance program.97 Unsurprisingly,
Siemens received a compliance monitor, despite its herculean remediation
efforts and expansive internal investigation.98
In the case of Faro Technologies, Inc. (―Faro‖), the violations did not
permeate the company as in the Siemens case, but rather just upper
management, who allegedly knew about the corrupt payments.99 The
Director of Asia-Pacific Sales (―Sales Director‖) recommended a former
employee of Faro‘s Chinese distributor for a new Country Sales Manager
position.100 After the Country Manager was hired, he requested permission
from the Director of Asia-Pacific Sales and two other Faro officers to ―do
business the Chinese way‖ and bribe officials. The request was officially
denied, but soon after, the Sales Director authorized the Country Manager
to make illegal cash payments to employees of Chinese state-owned
companies to obtain contracts.101 The Country Manager repeatedly
expressed the need to provide cash in return for the award of contracts, and
the Sales Director indicated his understanding of this need and continued to
approve the transactions.102 To ensure the scheme was not discovered, the
Sales Director instructed Faro-China‘s staff to alter account entries and
delete those referring to improper payments.103 While this conduct
transpired, Faro failed to provide any training or education regarding the

95. Siemens Complaint, supra note 94, at 2.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. See MARTIN T. BIEGELMAN & DANIEL R. BIEGELMAN, FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES
ACT COMPLIANCE GUIDEBOOK: PROTECTING YOUR ORGANIZATION FROM BRIBERY AND
CORRUPTION 112-14 (2010) (discussing Siemens‘s leniency and amnesty programs for
current and former employees as tools to gain additional information and evidence).
99. See Press Release, Dep‘t of Justice, Statoil ASA Satisfies Obligations Under
Deferred Prosecution Agreement and Foreign Bribery Charges are Dismissed (Nov 19,
2009), available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2009/November/09-crm-1257.html
(discussing Statoil‘s acknowledgement that it had made corrupt payments and its agreement
to pay a $10.5 million penalty).
100. See generally Cease-and-Desist Order, Faro Techs., Inc., Exchange Act Release No.
57933, Accounting and Auditing Enforcement No. 2836 (June 5, 2008), available at
http://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/2008/34-57933.pdf [hereinafter Faro Techs. Cease-andDesist Order].
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id.

DIAMANT FINALIZED_ONE_UPDATED

340

U. OF PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW

3/22/2011 4:25 PM

[Vol. 13:2

FCPA to its employees, agents, or subsidiaries.104 In addition, Faro lacked
an established corporate program to monitor its business operations to
ensure compliance with the FCPA. The U.S. prosecutors required Faro,
like Siemens, to retain a monitor.105
In contrast, the relevant conduct generally seemed less pervasive at
companies that were not required to retain a monitor. It appears, although
it is by no means a rule, that the government tends not to impose monitors
when the illegal conduct is limited to just a few individuals within a
company or when the conduct was limited in its scope.106
In the case of hedge fund Omega Advisors, Inc., a single employee
was responsible for the inappropriate conduct.107 Indeed, there was no
evidence of corruption or improper conduct outside the actions of the
isolated employee.108 Omega entered into an NPA, but was not required to
retain an outside monitor. Similarly, the SEC did not require Oil States
International (―Oil States‖) to retain a monitor to resolve wrongdoing at the
company.109 Employees in the eastern Venezuelan branch office of an Oil
States subsidiary, Hydraulic Well Control, LLC, allegedly made corrupt
payments.110 The conduct was limited to this single branch office and did
104. Id.
105. There are other instances where improper conduct involving the ratification of highlevel officials resulted in the imposition of an independent compliance monitor. See, e.g.,
Deferred Prosecution Agreement, United States v. Willbros Group, Inc., No. 08-cr-0287
(S.D. Tex. May 14, 2008) [hereinafter Willbros Deferred Prosecution Agreement]; SEC
Sanctions Westinghouse Air Brake Technologies Corporation for Improper Payments to
Indian Government Employees, Litigation Release No. 20457 (Feb. 14, 2008), available at
http://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/2008/lr20457.htm.
106. See, e.g., Cease-and-Desist Order, Oil States Int‘l, Inc., Securities Exchange Act
Release No. 53732, Accounting and Auditing Enforcement Release No. 2424 (Apr. 27,
2006) [hereinafter Oil States Cease-and-Desist Order] (finding that the illegal conduct was
limited to employees of a subsidiary).
107. Letter from Michael J. Garcia, U.S. Attorney for the Southern District of New York,
to Robert J. Annelo, Morvillo, Abramowitz, Grand, Iason, Anello, & Bohrer, P.C. (June 19,
2007), available at http://www.law.virginia.edu/pdf/faculty/garrett/omegaadvisors.pdf;
Press Release, U.S. Attorney‘s Office, S. Dist. N.Y., U.S. Announces Settlement with
Hedge Fund Omega Advisors, Inc. in Connection with Omega‘s Investment in Privatization
Program in Azerbaijan (Jul. 6, 2007), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/usao/nys/
pressreleases/July07/omeganonprospr.pdf.
108. Similarly, the illegal conduct in the Immucor case was also limited to a single
individual. Immucor was not required to hire a monitor. See SEC Files Action Naming
Officer of Immucor, Inc., Litigation Release No. 20316 (Sept. 28, 2007), available at
http://fcpaenforcement.com/FILES/tbl_s31Publications/FileUpload137/4495/DeChirico
PressRelease.pdf (describing a final judgment ordering payment of a $30,000 civil penalty).
109. Oil States Cease-and-Desist Order, supra note 106.
110. Id.
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not represent typical Oil States business dealings. Furthermore, the
improper conduct was isolated to low-level employees; there was no
indication that senior management was involved.
It is unsurprising for at least two reasons that prosecutors are more
likely to require monitors in cases of pervasive FCPA violations. First,
because the illegal conduct is widespread, eliminating it is more difficult
and time-consuming. This may very well result from a culture of
corruption within the company—ingrained business practices that are
difficult to uproot. A more thorough review of a company‘s activities is
probably necessary to engage employees in a range of businesses and
locations and help the company stamp out lingering pockets of noncompliance. Such a task is well-suited for a monitor who can dedicate
himself or herself to reviewing the various functions and businesses
independently.
The second reason why monitors may make more sense in cases of
pervasive corruption is that they also often point to an ineffective system of
internal controls. Developing such a system is often a complex, laborious,
and time-intensive project. Undoubtedly, by the time the monitor begins
his or her work, the company will have embarked on a remedial
augmentation of its internal controls; the monitor, however, can provide
invaluable guidance on where weaknesses remain or risks linger,
insufficiently addressed. Due to the expense and inconvenience of many
internal controls, the monitor‘s independence and authority may aid the
company in instituting needed controls in spite of grumbling from the
business line.
B.

Existence and Enforcement of Internal Compliance Programs

In fact, the existence of an effective compliance program is perhaps
independently the most important factor in whether or not a company
receives a monitor. The Morford Memorandum specifically states that ―it
may be appropriate to use a monitor where a company does not have an
effective internal compliance program, or where it needs to establish
necessary internal controls.‖111 In light of this guidance, prosecutors
heavily weigh the pre-existence of an effective compliance program
designed to detect and guard against illegal activity. For example, the
Micrus Corporation (―Micrus‖)112 and GE InVision Inc. (―InVision‖)113
111. See Morford Memo, supra note 28, at 2.
112. See Press Release, Dep‘t of Justice, Micrus Corporation Enters into Agreement to
Resolve Potential Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Liability (Mar. 2, 2005), available at
http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2005/March/05_crm_090.htm (requiring Micrus to retain an
independent policy expert for a period of three years as a result of its criminal violations of
the FCPA).
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agreements noted that the offending companies had no effective FCPA
compliance programs; prosecutors required monitors in both cases. In
contrast, the SEC did not impose a monitor on ITT. At the time of the
allegedly improper conduct, the company already had in place a Corporate
Compliance Ombudsman program to receive and respond to complaints of
alleged wrongdoing throughout the organization.114
The mere existence of a compliance program, however, is not in itself
enough to ward off the imposition of a monitor. Indeed, the government is
particularly sensitive to instances where compliance programs were clearly
ineffective or effectively ignored.115 ―Paper programs‖ are simply
insufficient.
The United States Sentencing Guidelines outline the
requirements of an effective compliance and ethics program.116
Organizations must (1) establish standards and protocols to prevent and
detect criminal conduct; (2) require organizational leaders, including the
board and senior management, to supervise the program; (3) use reasonable
efforts to exclude individuals who have engaged in illegal activities or
other improper conduct from supervising the compliance program;
(4) regularly train employees and furnish them with information regarding
the organization‘s compliance program; (5) monitor, evaluate, and
publicize the organization‘s compliance program to ensure its continued
effectiveness; (6) promote the compliance and ethics program through
incentives to act in accordance with the program and disciplinary measures
for failing to adhere to the program requirements; and (7) take reasonable
113. See GE InVision Inc., Security Act Release No. 51199, Accounting and
Enforcement Release No. 2186 (Feb. 14, 2005), available at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/
admin/34-51199.htm (describing an order instituting a cease-and-desist proceeding and
indicating that ―InVision provided no formal training or education to its employees . . . or its
sales agents and distributors regarding the requirements of the FCPA‖ and ―failed to
establish a program to monitor its foreign agents and distributors for compliance with the
FCPA‖).
114. See SEC Files Settled Charges Against ITT Corporation, Accounting and Auditing
Enforcement Release No. 2934, Litigation Release No. 20896, available at
http://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/2009/lr20896.htm (discussing the failure of ITT to
maintain proper books, records, and accounts with sufficient detail to account for the actions
of its subsidiary, NGP).
115. See, e.g., Press Release, Dep‘t of Justice, Baker Hughes Subsidiary Pleads Guilty to
Bribing Kazakh Official and Agrees to Pay $11 Million Criminal Fine as Part of Largest
Combined Sanction Ever Imposed in FCPA Case (Apr. 26, 2007), available at
http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2007/April/07_crm_296.html (describing Baker Hughes‘s
agreement to hire an independent monitor for a period of three years to oversee its
compliance program and make proper reports to the company and the DOJ).
116. See generally U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 8B2.1(b) (2010). Please
note that this version of the Sentencing Guidelines went into effect on November 1, 2010.

DIAMANT FINALIZED_ONE_UPDATED

3/22/2011 4:25 PM

2011] FCPA MONITORSHIPS AND HOW THEY CAN WORK BETTER

343

steps, if criminal conduct is discovered, to address the conduct and make
any needed changes to the organization‘s compliance and ethics program to
prevent future misbehavior.117
C.

No Clear Pattern Emerges From Other Aspects of the Enforcement
Actions

Surprisingly, the nature of the underlying improper payments that
drive the enforcement action in the first place does not seem to be
determinative (with the limited exception of the OFFP prosecutions).118 An
analysis of DPAs and NPAs formed since 2004 shows no clear, overarching pattern in this regard. It also suggests that factors such as whether
a company voluntarily discloses the FCPA violations, the amount of bribes
paid, and the amount of business gained by the bribes do not seem to have
much predictable effect on whether a company must hire a monitor.
One might expect that the amount of bribes paid and the financial
benefit they generated would play a major role in determining whether a
company receives a monitor, but this does not appear to be the case. For
example, the government did not require Lucent Technologies to hire a
monitor after paying hundreds of thousands of dollars in benefits related to

117. Id. at 32-34. The 2010 amendments to the Sentencing Guidelines provide an
additional Application Note, which clarifies the meaning of § 8B2.1(b)(7). The addition
states that subsection (b)(7) has two aspects:
First, the organization should respond appropriately to the criminal conduct.
The organization should take reasonable steps, as warranted under the
circumstances, to remedy the harm resulting from the criminal conduct. These
steps may include, where appropriate, providing restitution to identifiable
victims, as well as other forms of remediation. Other reasonable steps to
respond appropriately to the criminal conduct may include self-reporting and
cooperation with authorities.
Second, the organization should act appropriately to prevent further similar
criminal conduct, including assessing the compliance and ethics program and
making modifications necessary to ensure the program is effective. The steps
taken should be consistent with subsections (b)(5) and (c) and may include the
use of an outside professional advisor to ensure adequate assessment and
implementation of any modifications.
U.S. Sentencing Commission, Amendments to the Sentencing Guidelines 34-35 (May 3,
2010),
available
at
http://www.ussc.gov/Guidelines/2010_guidelines/Proposed_
Amendments/20100503_Reader_Friendly_Proposed_Amendments.pdf.
118. Few OFFP-related settlements have resulted in the imposition of a compliance
monitor. This may reflect the unusual nature of these cases, involving a unique U.N.
program and improper conduct that was required by the highest levels of the Iraqi
government. In fact, with the exception of the Ingersol-Rand settlement, only those cases
that also involve other improper conduct outside of the OFFP (e.g., the Daimler, Innospec,
and Siemens settlements) have resulted in a monitorship.
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approximately $2 billion worth of potential business.119 Compare this to
the Monsanto Company agreement, which imposed a monitor when the
underlying bribe was only $50,000.120 Likewise, the Schering-Plough
Corporation agreement mandated a monitor to settle a case involving only
$76,000 in improper payments.121
One of the most unusual incongruities in the U.S. government‘s
imposition of FCPA monitors arose out of an FCPA case in which federal
prosecutors alleged that four companies, Halliburton Co./KBR, Inc./
Kellogg Brown & Root LLC, Technip, Snamprogetti, and JGC Corporation
of Japan, conspired to bribe Nigerian officials. (The Technip and
Snamprogetti settlements are discussed above.) Surprisingly—and without
explanation—the regulators imposed an FCPA compliance monitor on
KBR, Inc., and Technip, but did not require a monitor as a term of its
settlement with Snamprogetti.122
Other factors that one might reasonably anticipate would usually
119. Lucent Technologies Inc. Non-Prosecution Agreement, supra note 5, at 2. See
Complaint at 11, SEC v. Lucent Techs. Inc. (D.D.C. 2007), available at
http://www.sec.gov/litigation/complaints/2007/comp20414.pdf (describing expectations of
potential business opportunities reaching $2-3 billion).
120. See Press Release, Dep‘t of Justice, Monsanto Company Charged with Bribing
Indonesian Government Official: Prosecution Deferred for Three Years (Jan. 6, 2005),
available at http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/pr/2005/January/05_crm_008.htm (describing the
repercussions of Monsanto‘s attempted payment of $50,000 to an Indonesian official to
induce him to modify the requirements of an environmental impact statement).
121. See generally SEC v. Schering-Plough Corp., Litigation Release No. 18740, (June
9, 2004), available at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/lr18740.htm. It is an open
question, however, if these matters arose today in the current mega-monetary-sanction
environment, whether the government would impose a monitor.
122. See Deferred Prosecution Agreement at 4, United States v. Technip S.A., No. H-10439 (S.D. Tex. 2010), available at http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/docs/
06-28-10-technip-agreement.pdf [hereinafter Technip Deferred Prosecution Agreement]
(discussing Technip‘s conduct related to corrupt payments and false books); Press Release,
Dep‘t of Justice, Snamprogetti Netherlands B.V. Resolves Foreign Corrupt Practices Act
Investigation and Agrees to Pay $240 Million Criminal Penalty (July 7, 2010), available at
http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2010/July/10-crm-780.html
(describing
Snamprogetti‘s
agreement to pay a $240 million penalty for its involvement over a ten-year period in
bribing Nigerian government officials to obtain various procurement and construction
contracts); Press Release, Dep‘t of Justice, Kellogg Brown & Root LLC Pleads Guilty to
Foreign Bribery Charges and Agrees to Pay $402 Million Criminal Fine (Feb. 11, 2009),
available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2009/February/09-crm-112.html (describing
Kellogg‘s guilty plea relating to its participation in a decade-long scheme to bribe Nigerian
government officials to grant various contracts); Press Release, Securities and Exchange
Commission, SEC Charges KBR and Halliburton for FCPA Violations (Feb. 11, 2009),
available at http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2009/2009-23.htm (discussing KBR
Halliburton‘s agreement to pay $177 million in disgorgement to settle its SEC fines).
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influence a prosecutor‘s decision in this area are also not determinative.
For example, a company‘s willingness to report its misconduct voluntarily
or to cooperate with prosecutors does not seem to affect whether the
government mandates the appointment of a monitor. In fact, in many
settlements where prosecutors noted the company‘s efforts at self-reporting
and willingness to cooperate, the government still required monitors. Of
the thirty companies that received compliance monitors from 2004 to 2010,
twenty voluntarily disclosed the improper conduct to the government,
which seems to exemplify the adage that no good deed goes unpunished.
All of this is not to say that factors such as the amount paid in bribes, the
amount of business acquired through bribes, and a company‘s willingness
to cooperate are irrelevant to prosecutors‘ decisions. But these factors have
no consistently evident or measureable effects on whether the government
will require a company to retain a monitor as a term of an FCPA settlement
agreement.
III. COMMON TERMS OF FCPA MONITORSHIPS
Today, no official definition of a compliance monitor exists, and this
is unlikely to change. The United States Sentencing Commission recently
considered a proposed amendment to § 8D1.4 of the United States
Sentencing Guidelines. The proposed amendment would have required
that a monitor be independent and properly qualified and that the scope of
the monitorship be subject to court approval. On April 7, 2010, the
Sentencing Commission rejected this proposal, leaving the status quo of
DOJ and SEC oversight and control.123
Each FCPA monitorship is strictly a creation of the settlement with the
government, and the settlement agreement, in effect a written contract,
123. Corporate counsel were largely uneasy about having the Sentencing Guidelines
formally address the issue of monitors. See Susan Hackett, Ass‘n of Corporate Counsel,
Testimony to the U.S. Sentencing Commission regarding proposals to amend Chapter 8 of
the Guidelines Manual 3 (Mar. 17, 2010), available at http://www.ussc.gov/AGENDAS/
20100317/Hackett_ACC_Testimony.pdf (―We believe that repeated insertion of a ‗monitor
option‘ into the Guidelines‘ Manual suggests that the Commission sees the practice as some
kind of ‗best‘ or common practice that judges should consider routinely, rather than the
nuclear option that most folks who‘ve ever worked in a monitor situation perceive it to
be.‖); Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher LLP, U.S. Sentencing Commission Amends Requirements
for an Effective Compliance and Ethics Program (Apr. 13, 2010), available at
http://www.gibsondunn.com/publications/pages/USSentencingCommissionAmendsRequire
mentsForEffectiveComplianceEthicsProgram.aspx (―As for the second component (steps to
prevent future similar criminal conduct), the Commission‘s original version of the
amendment would have stated that ‗[t]he organization may take the additional step of
retaining an independent monitor to ensure adequate assessment and implementation of the
modifications‘ to the compliance program. The reference to monitors drew criticism for
appearing to endorse and encourage a tool that rarely is necessary or appropriate.‖).
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defines its terms. Theoretically, the settlement agreements tailor each
monitorship as is necessary to assuage the government‘s concerns and to
help ensure compliance with the FCPA. In reality, however, some basic
parameters tend to frame FCPA settlement agreements. The DOJ‘s
Morford Memorandum, which was issued in 2008, has lent some
standardization to the FCPA monitorship process by providing useful
guidance for prosecutors on the selection and use of monitors.
The Morford Memorandum explains that a monitor should be selected
based on his or her ―merits.‖124 The selection process must ensure that
(1) ―a highly qualified and respected person or entity‖ is selected ―based on
suitability for the assignment and all of the circumstances,‖ (2) ―potential
and actual conflicts of interest[]‖ are avoided, and (3) there is public
confidence in the effectiveness of the monitorship.125 To ensure that
conflicts of interest do not arise, prosecutors are not permitted to veto a
monitor candidate unilaterally, but instead must create a standing or ad hoc
committee in the DOJ ―component or office where the case originated to
consider monitor candidates.‖126 After the committee approves of a
monitor candidate, the Office of the Deputy Attorney General must also
approve the monitor.127
To garner public confidence in the monitorship, the government
should decline to accept a monitor if he or she has ―an interest in, or
relationship with, the corporation or its employees, officers or directors that
would cause a reasonable person to question the monitor‘s impartiality.‖128
In addition, the corporation must agree not to employ or become affiliated
with the monitor for at least one year from the date the monitorship is
terminated.
Once a monitor is selected, the following principles must be followed:
A monitor‘s primary responsibility should be to assess and
monitor a corporation‘s compliance with those terms of the
agreement that are specifically designed to address and reduce
the risk of recurrence of the corporation‘s misconduct, including,
in most cases, evaluating (and where appropriate proposing)
internal controls and corporate ethics and compliance programs.
....
In carrying out his or her duties, a monitor will often need to
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.

Morford Memo, supra note 28, at 3.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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understand the full scope of the corporation‘s misconduct
covered by the agreement, but the monitor‘s responsibilities
should be no broader than necessary to address and reduce the
risk of recurrence of the corporation‘s misconduct.129
The Morford Memorandum, which addresses all compliance
monitorships, not just those that involve FCPA enforcement, provides
intentionally ―flexible‖ guidelines.130
This reflects the reality that
monitorships will differ ―[g]iven the varying facts and circumstances of
each case.‖131 The past six years of FCPA settlements exemplify this
anticipated diversity in the terms of monitorships. Of the thirty companies
that received monitors in this time period as a result of an FCPA violation,
surprisingly, no two formed settlement agreements with the government
that had identical monitorship parameters. Terms vary as to the length of
the monitorship, the process of selecting the monitor, the role of the
monitor, and the scope of review. The agreements demonstrate that the
requirements for FCPA compliance monitorship continue to evolve and
that corporations have some flexibility in negotiating for terms that best fit
their situations.
A.

Length of Monitorship

The length of FCPA monitorships has varied greatly, lasting anywhere
from a few months to four years. Over time, the length of monitorships has
generally increased; the most common monitorship length is three years.
Between 2004 and 2010, seventeen companies received three-year FCPA
monitorships, six companies received monitorships of less than one year,
two companies had monitorships of eighteen months, and two companies
had a two-year monitorship.
In December 2008, the government settled with Siemens and required
a four-year monitorship—the first FCPA monitorship of its kind.132 The
agreement, however, contained a clause allowing the length of the
monitorship to be decreased or increased depending on the results of
periodic reports to the government. This flexibility in duration was also a
first, and settlement agreements entered into after the Siemens agreement
included language allowing the monitorship‘s timeframe to be decreased or
increased if needed. The upside to this greater flexibility, of course, is the
opportunity for the company to fix problems and exit the monitorship as
soon as possible. Shortening the duration of the monitorship has the
129. Id. at 5-6.
130. Id. at 2.
131. Id.
132. The change starting with Siemens may be attributable to the apparent failures of the
Aibel monitorship, which is discussed below.
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potential of providing the company with large cost savings. If, however,
the government determined that the monitor had not yet met with enough
success, the company could be doomed to an expensive, seemingly neverending monitorship.
A company negotiating a settlement agreement that requires retaining
a monitor should strongly consider whether it wants language similar to
that found in the Siemens agreement. It may be worthwhile to push for a
term that includes the ability to curtail the monitorship‘s duration, without
the corresponding opportunity to increase its length.
B.

Number of Reports

The number of reports an FCPA monitor must provide to the
government varies and is usually tied to the length of the monitorship.
Most settlement agreements require an initial report in the monitorship‘s
first year and annual follow-up reports. In fact, there were only two
exceptions to this pattern between 2004 and 2010: Micrus and Diagnostic
Products Corporation entered into settlement agreements that mandated
biannual reports to the government, resulting in a total of six reports over
three years. These two minor exceptions aside, the duration of the FCPA
monitorship generally determines the number of reports.
If the length of the monitorship increases or decreases based on
language similar to that found in the Siemens agreement, then the number
of required reports will also change. In addition to formal reports, the
Siemens agreement included language requiring informal meetings among
the company, monitor, and government to ensure that the monitorship is
progressing in a positive and productive manner. This extra ―check‖ on the
monitorship is valuable, and companies and regulators alike should
strongly consider including it in settlement agreements.
C.

Choosing a Monitor

As is discussed in the Morford Memorandum, the selection of a
monitor requires cooperation between the government and the company.
Only four FCPA settlement agreements formed between 2004 and 2010
specified who the monitor would be: Paradigm BV, Ingersoll-Rand,
Siemens, and Daimler.133 If the agreement does not provide the monitor‘s
133. See Deferred Prosecution Agreement, supra note 5 (specifying that Louis J. Freeh
was proposed by Daimler and approved by the DOJ to serve as monitor); Deferred
Prosecution Agreement, United States v. Ingersoll-Rand Italiana SpA, No. 1:07cr00294,
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identity, it will require the company to obtain government approval of the
company‘s chosen candidates—usually within sixty days of the
agreement‘s finalization.
This practice, however, was recently lambasted by the district court
judge overseeing the guilty plea of Innospec.134 She expressed concern that
the monitor was not specified in the agreement.135 And although she
ultimately accepted the plea, the judge informed the government that she
wanted to review the person selected as monitor, as well as the monitor‘s
work plan.136 The judge‘s reaction was unexpected, and it is unclear what
effect this event may have on future monitorship agreements.137 To date,
FCPA settlement agreements have only required a monitor‘s selection and
(D.D.C. Nov. 14, 2007), available at http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/docs/
ingersollrand-deferred-agree.pdf [hereinafter Ingersoll-Rand Deferred Prosecution
Agreement] (specifying that Jeffrey M. Kaplan was retained as an outside consultant to
review the compliance program of Ingersoll and its subsidiaries); Letter from Steven A.
Tyrrell et al., Dep‘t of Justice, to Scott W. Muller and Angela T. Burgess, Davis Polk &
Wardwell (Dec. 15, 2008), available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/documents/ siemens.pdf
(specifying that Dr. Theo Waigel would serve as an independent monitor); Letter from
Steven A. Tyrrell, Chief, Dep‘t of Justice, to Saul M. Pilchen, Skadden, Arps, Slate,
Meagher & Flom LLP, at app. C (Sept. 21, 2007), available at http://judiciary.house.gov/
hearings/pdf/deferredprosecution/Paradigm070921.pdf [hereinafter Paradigm Deferred
Prosecution Agreement] (specifying that the law firm of Skadden Arps Slate Meagher and
Flom LLP was retained as outside compliance counsel)..
134. See Christopher M. Matthews, Judge Blasts Compliance Monitors at Innospec Plea
Hearing, MAIN JUSTICE, Mar. 18, 2010 available at http://www.mainjustice.com/2010/03/
18/innospec-pleads-guilty-fcpa-charges/ (discussing U.S. District Judge Ellen Segal
Huvelle‘s dissatisfaction with the Innospec agreement and critique of independent
compliance monitors in general).
135. See id. (―Huvelle was disturbed that the monitor was not named in the plea
agreement . . . ‗I want to know how this is going to work, I have an obligation to the public
to find out,‘ she said.‖).
136. Id.
137. The judge‘s reaction may reflect the very public controversy and ensuing criticism
surrounding the (non-FCPA) monitorship of former Attorney General John Ashcroft, whose
engagement, reportedly worth up to $52 million, resulted from a no-bid referral from a
former colleague at the Department of Justice. See Transparency and Integrity in Corporate
Marketing: Hearing Before the Subcomm. On Commercial and Administrative Law of the H.
Comm. On the Judiciary, 111th Cong. 1 (2009) (statement of Rep. Steve Cohen) available
at http://judiciary.house.gov/hearings/printers/111th/111-64_53640.PDF (―One notorious
example, which we explored in our previous hearings, was the Zimmer case. That is when
Caesar‘s wife was very disturbed. U.S. Attorney then, now governor-to-be Christopher
Christie, selected former Attorney General John Ashcroft to serve as a corporate monitor,
for which Mr. Ashcroft collected a fee of up to or in the neighborhood of or resembling or
within the margin of error of $52 million. A tidy sum, it could pay for some drycleaning for
Mrs. Caesar‘s robes.‖); Nina Totenberg, House Panel Questions Ashcroft on No-Bid
Contract,
NPR:
MORNING
EDITION,
Mar.
12,
2008,
available
at
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=88132206&ft=1&f=1006 (discussing
the House Judiciary Committee‘s questioning of former Attorney General John Ashcroft
about a no-bid contract that his consulting firm received from a former colleague in the
Justice Department).
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work plan to be approved by the government; they have not included
language mandating court approval as well. Adding a layer of judicial
scrutiny could increase costs, as the monitor and the company would need
to make court appearances and respond to the judge‘s requests, which
would most likely be more unpredictable than those of the regulators, who
regularly handle FCPA cases. On the other hand, courts could theoretically
serve as a check on the government and even an out-of-control monitor.
Other factors related to the selection of monitors are much less
standardized and include who selects the monitor and how the monitor is
ultimately chosen, whether the same person serves as the monitor for
related DOJ and SEC settlements, and how to handle a dispute between the
monitor and the company. Typically, the government has allowed
companies to identify and propose monitorship candidates. In some
agreements, the company must submit a pool of acceptable candidates,
leaving the government to select the monitor from that pool or request
additional candidates.138 In other instances, the government allowed the
company to continue presenting prospective monitors to the government
until agreement on a mutually acceptable candidate.139 Occasionally, the
government selected the monitor for the company, but the Morford
Memorandum has presumably put an end to that practice.140 The DOJ
recently exercised its authority to reject a monitor picked by a corporation.
As discussed above, in March 2010, BAES entered into a settlement
agreement with the DOJ that required the imposition of a monitor.141
138. E.g., Plea Agreement, United States v. Kellogg Brown & Root, LLC, No. H-09071, (S.D. Tex. Feb. 11, 2009), available at http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/
cases/docs/kbr-plea-agree.pdf [hereinafter Kellogg Brown & Root Plea Agreement].
139. E.g., Letter from Steven A. Tyrrell, Chief, Fraud Section, Dep‘t of Justice, to
Gregory S. Bruch, Willkie Farr & Gallagher LLP., at app. C (June 3, 2008), available at
http://www.corporatecrimereporter.com/documents/FaroAgreement.pdf. It appears to have
taken Faro and the DOJ nearly two years to agree on a monitor. Mike Koehler, Faro’s
Monitor – Late and Expensive, FCPA Professor Blog (Dec. 27, 2010, 5:21 AM), available
at http://fcpaprofessor.blogspot.com/2010/12/faros-monitor-late-and-expensive.html.
140. See, e.g., Deferred Prosecution Agreement at 10, United States v. York Int‘l Corp.,
No. 07-CR-00253 (D.D.C. Oct. 15, 2007), available at http://www.justice.gov/criminal/
fraud/fcpa/cases/docs/ 10-15-07york-agree.pdf [hereinafter York Int‘l Deferred Prosecution
Agreement] (allowing the DOJ to choose the monitor if the DOJ and company could not
decide on a mutually agreeable monitor within thirty days); Deferred Prosecution
Agreement at 12, United States v. Baker Hughes, Inc., No. 07-CR-130 (S.D. Tex. Apr. 11,
2007),
available
at
http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/docs/04-1107bakerhughes-prosecution.pdf [hereinafter Baker Hughes Deferred Prosecution
Agreement] (allowing the DOJ to choose the monitor if the DOJ and company could not
decide on a mutually agreeable monitor within thirty days).
141. Christopher M. Matthews, Justice Department Opposed BAE Monitor Picks, MAIN
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Under the terms of the agreement, BAES had ninety days in which to hire a
monitor, but the DOJ rejected the proposed candidates because they
―appeared to lack experience establishing or monitoring the effectiveness
of compliance programs,‖ in addition to other perceived weaknesses.142
Regardless of the process involved, the government may veto the chosen
monitor, and the court may, as is evidenced by the agreement with
Innospec, also weigh in on the selection.143
Frequently, both the SEC and the DOJ have required the imposition of
a monitor for related FCPA conduct. The agreements with each agency,
however, typically employ different language to impose the requirement.
Strikingly, few FCPA settlement agreements include language requiring
that the monitor be the same individual for both the DOJ and SEC
settlements. In fact, only two companies entered into agreements between
2004 and 2010 that indicate that the DOJ and SEC are to have the same
monitor: Schnitzer Steel Industries, Inc. (―Schnitzer Steel‖) and InVision.
It is possible that, in the absence of such of provision, the SEC and DOJ
may not agree on a prospective monitor. But because the agencies usually
coordinate so closely on FCPA enforcement, this is unlikely.144
One wrinkle in FCPA monitor selection has been the increasing
frequency with which the government imposes monitors on non-U.S.
offenders. Indeed, FCPA settlements with non-U.S.-based multinational
corporations implicate a range of thorny conflict of law questions. The
FCPA settlement with Technip, for instance, mandates that the monitor be
a French citizen, as French criminal law prohibits a foreign investigation in
France.145 Similarly, Alcatel-Lucent, which publicly announced its pending
FCPA settlement, agreed with the U.S. government that the monitor must

JUSTICE, June 3, 2010, available at http://www.mainjustice.com/2010/06/03/justicedepartment-opposed-bae-monitor-picks/print/#comments_controls.
142. Id. Although BAES‘s alleged conduct included actions that could be deemed
violative of the FCPA, the company did not technically plead guilty to violations of the
FCPA.
143. Letter from Kathleen M. Hamann, Dep‘t of Justice, to Laurence Urgenson, Kirkland
& Ellis LLP 8 (Mar. 5, 2010), available at http://fcpa.shearman.com/files/b62/
b621ad75bdd7f13a615b7d90a994e415.pdf?i=0b2e9227a0b54ac8bd3942b083fa9605.
144. The two agencies did, however, diverge in handling the recent FCPA enforcement
actions against Alliance One International. The DOJ filed charges in the District Court for
the Eastern District of Virginia; the SEC pursued the case in federal court in Washington,
D.C. Press Release, Dep‘t of Justice, Alliance One International Inc. and Universal
Corporation Resolve Related FCPA Matters Involving Bribes Paid to Foreign Government
Officials (Aug. 6, 2010), available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2010/August/10-crm903.html; Complaint, SEC v. Alliance One International Inc., Case No. 1:1O-cv-01319
(D.D.C. Aug. 6, 2010), available at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/complaints/2010/
comp21618-alliance-one.pdf. This means that different judges will oversee the company‘s
monitorship.
145. Technip Deferred Prosecution Agreement, supra note 122, at Attachment D.

DIAMANT FINALIZED_ONE_UPDATED

352

U. OF PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW

3/22/2011 4:25 PM

[Vol. 13:2

be French.146 Finally, the Siemens FCPA settlement explicitly provides for
a German monitor, Dr. Theo Waigel, former German Minister of Finance,
supported by independent U.S. counsel.147 In contrast, other Europe-based
multinationals, like Daimler and Statoil ASA (―Statoil‖), opted for U.S.based monitors.148
Finally, FCPA settlement agreements differ in the procedures outlined
for resolving disputes between the company and the monitor regarding the
monitor‘s recommendations to the company for compliance program
improvement. Ten FCPA settlement agreements formed between 2004 and
2010 required the company to submit to the monitor‘s decision if the
company and monitor are unable to reach an agreement within a specified
amount of time. This language leaves the company at the mercy of the
monitor. Four companies were required to notify the government of the
dispute without having a discussion of how the dispute would be resolved.
Ten companies, nine of which were Siemens and the eight cases requiring
monitors that settled after Siemens, specified that the government would
settle disputes between the company and monitor. One company was
required to consult France‘s Central Service for the Prevention of
Corruption (―SCPC‖), a department attached to the French Ministry of
Justice.149 If after consultation with the SCPC, the company and monitor
failed to reach agreement, the monitor was required to take into
consideration the view of the SCPC and make the ultimate decision as to
whether the company should adopt the monitor‘s recommendation.
Language similar to that found in the Siemens agreement is the most
beneficial to the company. It allows the company to present alternatives to
the monitor‘s recommendations and ensures that the monitor is held
accountable by the government. It also enhances the probability that the
recommendations will ultimately serve the government‘s goals. The DOJ
146. Alcatel-Lucent Consolidated Financial Statements at December 31, 2009, at 114
(Nov. 2, 2010), available at http://www1.alcatel-lucent.com/4q2009/pdf/ConsolidatedFinancial-Statements-2009-GB11_feb10.pdf.
147. Letter from Steven A. Tyrrell et al., Dep‘t of Justice, to Scott W. Muller and Angela
T. Burgess, Davis Polk & Wardwell (Dec. 15, 2008), available at
http://www.justice.gov/opa/documents/siemens.pdf.
148. Daimler retained former FBI Director, Judge Louis Freeh; Statoil selected F. Joseph
Warin. Daimler Deferred Prosecution Agreement, supra note 5, at 10; Statoil, Annual
Report (Form 20-F) (Mar. 26, 2010), available at http://www.statoil.com/
AnnualReport2009/en/Sustainability/Society/EthicsAndTransparency/Pages/HortonCaseClo
sedContinuedFocusOnEthicsAndAnti-Corruption.aspx.
149. Deferred Prosecution Agreement, United States v. Technip, No. H-10-439, (D.D.C.
June 28, 2010), available at http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/docs/06-2810-technip-agreement.pdf [hereinafter Technip Deferred Prosecution Agreement].
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recently issued additional guidance to prosecutors via the Grindler
Memorandum regarding the drafting of settlement agreements, stating that
―an agreement should explain what role the Department could play in
resolving any disputes between the monitor and the corporation, given the
facts and circumstances of the case.‖150 Thus, future FCPA settlement
agreements should resemble the Siemens agreement in this respect.
D.

Attorney-Client Privilege

Companies required to retain monitors today typically agree not to
enter into an attorney-client relationship with the monitor. This was not
always the case. Some earlier agreements did not strictly prohibit the
company from forming an attorney-client relationship with the monitor, but
any attorney-client privilege had to be waived with respect to the agency
with which the company settled.151 Today, however, the vast majority of
agreements expressly forestall the creation of an attorney-client
relationship.152 The most recent agreements simply state that there is no
such relationship.153 Because this language is so explicit, companies may
find it extremely difficult to assert attorney-client privilege if an outside
party attempts to gain access to information communicated by the company
to the monitor.
Regardless of the language used, the lack of an attorney-client
relationship between the monitor and the company can pose a significant
risk of further legal exposure for the company. Because the monitor is
independent, actively reviews the company‘s practices, and reports to the
150. Memorandum from Gary G. Grindler, Acting Deputy Attorney General, to Heads of
Department Components United States Attorneys, on Additional Guidance on the Use of
Monitors in Deferred Prosecution Agreements and Non-Prosecution Agreements with
Corporations (May 25, 2010), available at http://www.justice.gov/dag/dag-memo-guidancemonitors.html.
151. See, e.g., Deferred Prosecution Agreement at 7, United States v. Monsanto Co.,
1:05-cr-00008
(D.D.C.
Jan.
6,
2005),
available
at
http://www.corporatecrimereporter.com/documents/monsantoagreement.pdf
[hereinafter
Monsanto Deferred Prosecution Agreement] (―To the extent that . . . the attorney-client
privilege could conceivably be applicable, it shall be a condition of that retention that
Monsanto Company shall waive . . . .‖).
152. The Statoil agreement, however, acknowledged that the monitor would maintain the
company‘s trade secrets and other confidential information in conformity with Norwegian
law. Deferred Prosecution Agreement at ¶ 12, United States v. Statoil, ASA, No. 06-cr00960 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 12, 2006) [hereinafter Statoil Deferred Prosecution Agreement],
available
at
http://www.abanet.org/intlaw/fall07/materials/StatoilDeferredProsecution
Agreement.pdf.
153. See, e.g., Kellogg Brown & Root Plea Agreement, supra note 138; Plea Agreement,
United States v. Control Components, Inc., SA CR No. 09-162 (C.D. Cal. July 24, 2009)
available at http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/control-components.html
[hereinafter Control Components Plea Agreement].
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government, the monitor might discover and reveal previously undisclosed
wrongdoing. Any such wrongdoing may or may not be FCPA related, but
if found by a monitor, it can lead to further scrutiny by the government and
additional penalties. For example, in May 2008, Willbros Group, Inc.
(―Willbros‖) entered into FCPA settlement agreements with the DOJ and
SEC.154 On May 20, 2010, Willbros filed an 8-K with the SEC, which
stated that its monitor‘s recent report to the DOJ
sets out for the DOJ‘s review the monitor‘s findings relating to
incidents that came to the monitor‘s attention during the course
of his review which he found to be significant, as well as
recommendations to address these incidents. We and the monitor
have met separately with the DOJ concerning certain of these
incidents. The monitor, in his report, did not conclude whether
any of these incidents or any other matters constituted a violation
of the FCPA. We do not believe that any of these incidents or
matters constituted a violation of the FCPA based on our own
investigations of the incidents and matters raised in the report.
Notwithstanding our assessment, the DOJ could perform further
investigation at its discretion of any incident or matter raised by
the report.155
The implications of this lack of attorney-client privilege and how
companies may address it are discussed further in Part V.D.
E.

Conflict of Interest

The monitor is supposed to perform an independent review of the
company‘s FCPA compliance policy and procedures. One of the reasons
that FCPA settlement agreements forbid an attorney-client relationship is
that it could undermine the monitor‘s independence. Similarly, it is
important that the company not retain the monitor as legal counsel
immediately after the monitorship concludes. Even if doing so would not
actually undermine the monitor‘s independence during the course of the
monitorship, the public‘s perception of the effectiveness of monitors could
be diminished if companies routinely hired monitors upon their
monitorships‘ conclusion. Because of this, almost every company entering
into an FCPA monitorship has been required to agree to a provision
154. Willbros Deferred Prosecution Agreement, supra note 105.
155. Willbros Group, Inc., Annual Report (Form 8-K), Exhibit 99.2: Risk Factors (May
20, 2010).
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prohibiting it from affiliating with or hiring a monitor for one or two years
after the monitorship term expires. Only five companies entered into
agreements without this cooling-off-period language between 2004 and
2010. The current trend is for the recusal period to last for one year.156
F.

Language Describing Monitor’s Responsibility

FCPA monitors typically develop a work plan and then issue
recommendations to the company throughout the course of executing that
plan. The language used in describing the monitor‘s responsibilities
regarding the recommendations he or she must issue varies only slightly
from agreement to agreement, but those minor variations can sometimes
have significance. The following represents the types of language
contained in agreements. Recommendations that
are ―reasonably designed‖ to achieve;
will ―ensure‖;
are ―reasonably designed to ensure‖;
are ―necessary and appropriate‖ to achieve;
are ―appropriately designed and implemented to ensure‖; or
are ―appropriately designed to accomplish‖ FCPA compliance.157
Note that the language choice leads to very different base-line
standards for the monitor‘s recommendations. Recommendations that are
―reasonably designed‖ to achieve FCPA compliance will likely be less
severe than those that are given to ―ensure‖ compliance. ―Ensuring‖
compliance is an elevated standard and may result in the company being
forced to adhere to recommendations that will severely burden aspects of
the company‘s business. Companies should carefully negotiate this type of
156. See, e.g., Plea Agreement at app. C, ¶ 3, United States v. Universal Leaf Tabacos
Ltda.,
No.
3:10-cr-225
(E.D.
Va.
Aug.
6,
2010),
available
at
http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/universal-leaf/08-06-10universal-leafsentencing-memo.pdf (―The Company agrees that it will not employ or be affiliated with the
Monitor for a period of not less than one year from the date the Monitor's work has
ended.‖); Letter from Denis J. McInerney, Dep‘t of Justice, to Edward J. Fuhrapp, Hunton
and
Williams
LLP.
C,
¶
4
(Aug.
6,
2010),
available
at
http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/docs/08-06-10alliance-one-npa.pdf
(―Alliance agrees that it will not employ or be affiliated with the Monitor for a period of not
less than one year from the date the Monitor's work has ended.‖).
157. See, e.g., Willbros Deferred Prosecution Agreement, supra note 105; Agreement
between Dep‘t of Justice and Micrus (Feb. 28, 2005), available at
http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/docs/02-28-05micrus-agree.pdf;
Ceaseand-Desist Order, Westinghouse Brake Tech. Corp., Exchange Act Release No. 57333,
Accounting And Auditing Enforcement Release No. 2785 (Feb. 14, 2008), available at
http://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/2008/34-57333.pdf;
Ingersoll-Rand
Deferred
Prosecution Agreement, supra note 133; Monsanto Deferred Prosecution Agreement, supra
note 151.
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language to make sure reasonable expectations are established.
G.

Differences in Monitorship Requirements in DOJ and SEC Settlements

If a company is settling with both the DOJ and SEC, it will have to
negotiate independently with each agency. In the past, this circumstance
has often resulted in two settlement agreements that include different
requirements. For example, Baker Hughes, Inc. (―Baker Hughes‖) entered
into a DPA with the DOJ and submitted to the entry of a Final Judgment to
settle with the SEC.158 The DPA and SEC Final Judgment, however, risked
conflicts for the company. The DPA specified the length of the
monitorship as thirty-six months, but the SEC agreement did not include
this information.159 The DOJ required three reports—one initial review
within 120 days of the monitor‘s retention, a follow-up review one year
after the initial review, and another follow-up review a year from the first
follow-up.160 The SEC required one report—150 days after the monitor‘s
retention.161 The DPA stated that if the DOJ and Baker Hughes could not
agree upon a monitor within thirty days, the DOJ ―in its sole discretion‖
would select the monitor. This did not, however, guarantee that the DOJ‘s
choice would be acceptable to the SEC, which required its own approval of
the monitor.162 The wording of these agreements could have resulted in
Baker Hughes having to retain two monitors. Even a single monitor may
have needed to issue two separate work plans.
This is in stark contrast to the FCPA settlements that Schnitzer Steel
entered into with the DOJ and SEC.163 Unlike most FCPA agreements
negotiated with multiple agencies, Schnitzer Steel‘s agreements closely
mirror each other. The DPA specified that the Monitor should be the same

158. Baker Hughes Deferred Prosecution Agreement, supra note 140; Final Judgment,
SEC v. Baker Hughes Inc., No. H-07-1408 (S.D. Tex. May 1, 2007) [hereinafter Baker
Hughes Final Judgment].
159. Baker Hughes Deferred Prosecution Agreement, supra note 140, at 12.
160. Id. at 15-17.
161. Baker Hughes Final Judgment, supra note 158, at 7.
162. Id. at 5.
163. Cease-and-Desist Order, Schnitzer Steel Industries, Inc., Exchange Act Release No.
54606, Accounting and Auditing Enforcement Release No. 2493 (Oct. 16, 2006), available
at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/2006/34-54606.pdf [hereinafter Schnitzer Steel
Cease-and-Desist Order]; Deferred Prosecution Agreement, Schnitzer Steel Industries, Inc.
(Oct. 16, 2006), available at http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/912603/
000107261306002130/exh10-1_14656.htm [hereinafter Schnitzer Steel Deferred
Prosecution Agreement].
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person appointed pursuant to an agreement with the SEC.164 Both the DPA
and SEC Order (1) stated that the monitor‘s reports should go to both
agencies,165 (2) required Schnitzer Steel to retain a monitor for thirty-six
months,166 (3) required three reports from the monitor,167 (4) explained that
the monitor was to assess and make recommendations ―reasonably
designed to improve Schnitzer Steel‘s programs, policies, and procedures
for ensuring compliance with the FCPA‖ and other applicable laws,168 and
(5) dictated that the company could not hire the monitor for two years after
it completed its work under the DPA and SEC Order.169
H.

Outliers

Several FCPA settlement agreements formed between 2004 and 2010
fall outside the norm. Two, in particular, are worth highlighting. In
September 2007, Paradigm BV (―Paradigm‖) entered into an NPA with the
DOJ.170 The NPA mandated probably the least onerous monitorship terms
ever imposed by an FCPA settlement. It specifically named the
compliance monitor—who, ironically, was the company‘s defense
counsel—but did not include typical FCPA monitorship language.171 In
fact, the text outlining Paradigm‘s responsibilities under the monitorship
fill only about half of a sheet of paper.172 This stands in contrast to other
FCPA agreements that expend multiple pages to define the imposed
monitorship. The length of the monitorship was eighteen months—also
unusual—and the agreement did not explicitly specify the requirements for
reporting to the DOJ.173 The only relevant term similar to the standard
FCPA settlement agreement was the requirement that the monitor
―[r]ecommend, where necessary and appropriate, enhancements to
Paradigm‘s compliance code, policies and procedures as they relate to the
FCPA.‖174
The Aibel Group‘s FCPA settlement represents another outlier. The
company entered a guilty plea after it failed to adhere to the terms of its
DPA.175 The DPA required Aibel to (1) establish a Compliance Committee
164. Schnitzer Steel Deferred Prosecution Agreement, supra note 163, at 9.
165. Id. at 12; Schnitzer Steel Cease-and-Desist Order, supra note 163, at 6.
166. Schnitzer Steel Deferred Prosecution Agreement, supra note 163, at 3, 5.
167. Id. at 6-7, 11.
168. Id. at 6, 11-12.
169. Id. at 8, 17.
170. Paradigm Deferred Prosecution Agreement, supra note 133.
171. Id. at app. C.
172. Id. at 2.
173. Id. at 1.
174. Id.
175. Plea Agreement at 1, United States v. Aibel Group Ltd., No. CR H-07-005 (S.D.
Tex. 2008), available at http://www.fcpaenforcement.com/documents/document_detail.asp
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of its Board of Directors, (2) engage outside compliance counsel to monitor
its duties and obligations under the DPA, and (3) establish and effectively
implement a compliance program with respect to the FCPA.176 The guilty
plea noted that Aibel ―committed substantial time, personnel, and resources
to meeting the obligations of the DPA.177 Despite that fact, [Aibel] failed to
meet its obligations.‖178 Aibel pleaded guilty and paid a $4.2 million fine,179
which, from a cost perspective, is probably a better deal than living with a
monitor for another year. On its own, the facts surrounding this plea would
qualify Aibel Group as a company falling outside the typical route of
companies required to implement monitorships. But what is arguably even
more interesting is the changes in subsequent agreements after Aibel‘s
guilty plea.
The companies that entered into settlement agreements after Aibel
pleaded guilty had strikingly different language in their agreements. First,
the agreements changed the handling of disputes between the company and
the monitor regarding the monitor‘s recommendations. Instead of deferring
to the monitor, the disputes are now referred to the appropriate agency‘s
staff, and the agency makes the determination as to whether the company
should abide by the monitor‘s recommendation. Further, pending the
agency‘s determination, the company is no longer required to implement
any contested recommendations. In addition, the agreements contain a
provision requiring the company and the agency to meet at least annually to
discuss the monitorship and any suggestions, comments, or improvements
the company may wish to propose. These changes may indicate that the
relationship between Aibel and its monitor became untenable.
IV. WHAT AN EFFECTIVE FCPA MONITORSHIP LOOKS LIKE
Having described the nature of FCPA monitorships and examined how
they have varied, the remainder of this article turns to a discussion of how
they can work better. Volumes have been written on virtually all
professional activities that lawyers may undertake.
Indeed, many
practitioners can offer lengthy advice on what an effective deposition, oral
argument, brief, or internal investigation looks like. This is certainly true
with regard to FCPA enforcement generally and for designing effective
?ID=5488&PAGE=2.
176. Id. at 10.
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. Id. at 9.
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compliance programs to avoid FCPA violations. There is, however, very
little guidance on how to conduct an effective monitorship.
One only needs to look at the very public questioning of now-Deputy
Attorney General Jim Cole‘s performance as AIG compliance monitor to
see that even extremely knowledgeable commentators may not always have
a clear view of the monitor‘s role.180 The benchmark for any monitor‘s
success is fulfilling the terms of the applicable settlement agreements. And
yet, in that particular case, no critics actually attempted to measure
Mr. Cole‘s performance against his mandate.
As the Morford
Memorandum clearly states, ―[a] monitor‘s primary responsibility should
be to assess and monitor a corporation‘s compliance with those terms of the
[settlement] agreement that are specifically designed to address and reduce
the risk of recurrence of the corporation‘s misconduct . . . .‖181 In other
words, Mr. Cole‘s success or failure turns on meeting the four corners of
the settlement agreement between AIG and the government, not whether
AIG subsequently had financial troubles.
This is also true of FCPA monitorships. Success or failure hinges on
fulfilling the monitor‘s mandate. Yet, there are certainly better and worse
ways to approach the core tasks that generally constitute the FCPA
monitorship. As shown above, the mandates for FCPA monitorships are
sufficiently similar such that practitioners in this field can begin to sketch
out some best practices. This section attempts to start that conversation.
A.

The Settlement Agreements Constitute the Monitor’s Bible

The cardinal rule for any monitor is that he or she must, at all times,
abide by the terms of the agreements with the DOJ and SEC. As it is the
deal for which the company bargained, it is incumbent upon all actors to
honor this contract and for the monitor to appreciate that his or her very
existence is a function of the settlements. The settlement agreements
dictate many of the key components of the specific FCPA monitorship: the
length of the monitorship, when and for how long the monitor will conduct
reviews, any certifications that a monitor may have to make, the nature and
general structure of fieldwork, and any work product that the monitor must
submit to the government and the company.
In short, the settlement agreements are the monitor‘s bible. But, as
with biblical texts, exegeses can differ, and the monitor will certainly at
180. See, e.g., Sue Reisinger, It’s Broken: AIG’s Federal Monitor Failed to Curtail Bad
Behavior. Is it Time to Reexamine the Program?, CORPORATE COUNSEL (July 1, 2009),
available at http://www.law.com/jsp/cc/PubArticleCC.jsp?id=1202431504805 (discussing
the challenges faced by AIG‘s DOJ-imposed monitor and questioning the value of the
monitor program in light of its massive failure).
181. Morford Memo, supra note 28, at 5.
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times disagree with the company. Currently, FCPA settlements normally
provide that any disputes are resolved by the government,182 but monitors
and companies alike should avoid resorting to this.
Successful
monitorships run on trust and cooperation. The minute a dispute is
appealed to the SEC or DOJ, the relationship may be irrevocably damaged.
Monitors and companies should therefore try to iron out any differences
and align their understandings of the monitorship mandate well in advance
of any fieldwork or report writing.
The best place to do this is in the monitor‘s work plan. Just as a legal
opinion starts with a statute and builds out from the text, so too does an
effective work plan clearly construct the monitor‘s reasoning for the
company, based on the settlement. To avoid squabbles in front of the
regulators, the monitor should allow the company to review and comment
on the draft work plan to be sure that both sides understand how the
monitor interprets his or her mandate. Once both sides agree, the mandate
discussion in the work plan can serve as a gloss on the settlement
agreement to be applied in subsequent years of the monitorship.
One difficulty that the company and the monitor may face during
these early goings is that the monitor only has the text of the settlement
agreements to interpret. The company, on the other hand, will inevitably
have the thrust and parry of the lengthy negotiations coloring its view of
the ultimate agreements. Despite protestations from the company, the
monitor cannot allow any parol evidence from the negotiations to influence
his or her view of the settlement agreements. It is, after all, unfair to allow
the company to change the monitor‘s interpretation without similar
evidence from the government. If, however, the government and the
company agree that a drafting error obscures the true intention behind the
settlement agreements, the monitor could adjust his or her approach. The
alteration of a monitorship based on settlement agreements approved by a
court would also require judicial sign-off, of course.
The terms of the settlement agreement not only empower monitors.
They also serve to protect the company from the monitor‘s overreach. For
instance, the time period provided for the initial and follow-up reviews
should limit any impulses that the monitor may have to conduct a yearround review. Further, FCPA settlements sometimes provide explicitly that
the monitor need not reinvestigate the old conduct that led to the
settlement.183 This restricts the monitor and his or her team to testing and
182. See, e.g., Control Components Plea Agreement, supra note 153; Kellogg Brown &
Root Plea Agreement, supra note 138.
183. See, e.g., Letter from Paul E. Pelletier, Dep‘t of Justice, to Lawrence Bryne,
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evaluating, not investigating. The company and the monitor should both
rigorously adhere to the time commitments in the settlement document and
avoid mission creep in the duties of the monitor.
B.

The Monitor’s Work Must Reflect Knowledge of the Business

It is easy for a monitor to focus on a company‘s compliance program
to the exclusion of all else. The compliance program is, after all, the
monitor‘s core concern. The monitor will almost certainly have a strong
background in the area of internal compliance programs, so he or she will
focus like a laser on the program and how it can be improved. Comparing
the company‘s compliance program to past programs the monitor has
worked with or designed is relatively straightforward. More challenging,
however, is understanding the business that the controls seek to safeguard.
Although obtaining such an understanding can be tedious and difficult, it is
essential.
There are a number of reasons why knowledge of the business is so
important. First, the monitor cannot begin to develop an initial risk profile
for the company if he or she fails to learn the business. The monitor‘s
fieldwork should reflect the risks that attend the business. The intersection
of internal controls and difficult business environments that potentially
expose the company to corruption should consume much of the
monitorship team‘s initial focus. Without understanding the business,
developing this focus is virtually impossible. Second, the monitor cannot
effectively evaluate the controls unless he or she knows how they work
with the business. Indeed, the company may boast controls that function
perfectly but fail to respond fully to the actual risks faced by the business.
Without understanding the company‘s business, the monitor will never
detect this problem.
Finally, an understanding of the business is essential for crafting
Pedersen & Houpt (Feb. 4, 2010), available at http://www.justice.gov/criminal/pr/
documents/03-01-10bae-plea-%20agreement.pdf (―In order to conduct an effective initial
review of the Anti-bribery and Export Control Policies and Procedures, the Monitor's initial
work plan shall include such steps as are reasonably necessary to develop an understanding
of the facts and circumstances surrounding any violations that may have occurred, but the
parties do not intend that the Monitor will conduct his or her own inquiry into those
historical events.‖); see also Siemens Final Judgment, supra note 94, at 8 (―The Monitor‘s
work plan for the initial review shall include such steps as are reasonably necessary to
conduct an effective initial review in accordance with the Mandate, including by developing
an understanding, to the extent the Monitor deems appropriate, of the facts and
circumstances surrounding any violations that may have occurred before the entry of the
Final Judgment, but in developing such understanding the Monitor is to rely to the extent
possible on available information and documents provided by Siemens, and it is not
intended that the Monitor will conduct his or her own inquiry into those historical events.‖)
(emphasis added)).
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workable recommendations. During the course of the monitorship, the
monitor and his or her team will develop an in-depth understanding of the
company‘s anti-corruption compliance program. This is, of course, the
team‘s main activity. But without an appreciation for what the business
does and how it does it, the monitor‘s work may consist of mere
abstractions. Often what appear to be ideal solutions flounder when judged
against the realities of the business, existing controls, and management
structures. And anti-bribery controls should secure the business without
fundamentally changing the way in which the business operates. Indeed,
substantive changes to the business to address a compliance problem,
although sometimes necessary, are a last resort. Whenever possible, any
recommendations should work within the current size and structure of the
company‘s existing compliance program, and the monitor‘s
recommendations should be practical given the existing organization, its
business model, and its culture.
C.

Detailed Work Plans Establish Transparency and Trust

An effective work plan for an FCPA monitorship establishes in
sufficient detail the contours of the monitor‘s work for that review period.
Although the monitor should build in contingencies and must not slavishly
follow the plan in the face of significantly changed circumstances, the
monitor as much as possible should endeavor to execute the work plan as
drafted. The monitorship will already be traumatic for the company, and
the uncertainty of a vague or unfocused work plan only will exacerbate
institutional unease. Further, it is important that the U.S. regulators have a
clear view of what precisely the monitor will do. A detailed work plan
gives the government and company alike a chance to comment.
Importantly, it is impossible to construct a detailed work plan for the
initial monitorship review without some advance fieldwork. The company
may allow its key compliance and business employees to present to the
monitor and his or her team pertinent information on the company and the
compliance program. By collecting and synthesizing such background
information, the monitor can craft a work plan that appropriately targets the
review and minimizes any dead ends or fruitless exercises. The production
of the detailed work plan following these information sessions then gives
the company a chance to correct any misunderstandings or erroneous
conclusions on the part of the monitor. By hiding the ball from the
company or the government with a vague work plan, the monitor may
create more work, engender mistrust, and waste the company‘s resources.
A sufficiently detailed work plan will address all of the core activities
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that the monitor anticipates in that year. It will typically include the
following:
 An overview of the monitor‘s role and objectives, rooted
in the text of the settlement agreements, to ensure that all
parties understand how the monitor views his or her
mandate;


A proposed timeline for the monitorship based on the
settlement agreements, including the date on which the
monitor will submit a final report to the government and
company;



A description of relevant compliance policies and
procedures to evaluate;



A list of relevant documents to review;



A list of interviewees (company employees and others,
like
independent
directors,
external
auditors,
ombudsmen, and maybe even external vendors);



A list of proposed site visits (with proposed dates); and



A list of tests, studies, and analyses to conduct and how
they will be conducted (including whether external or
internal audit resources will be utilized).

The more detailed the work plan is, the easier the process will be for
the company, and the more useful it will be for the monitor as a map of the
necessary work. It is important, however, that the work plan genuinely
reflect the tasks reasonably anticipated and that the monitor and his or her
team strive to adhere to it at all times. This includes meeting the proposed
dates for completion of fieldwork and submission of reports to the
company and the U.S. government. Delays in producing annual reports
may occur due to unanticipated events beyond the monitor‘s control. But
even under such trying circumstances, the monitor should try to produce
the report on time. Failure to do so can sap credibility from the
monitorship, complicate the company‘s efforts to implement
recommendations in a timely manner, and engender cynicism about the
process.
D.

The Monitor’s Report Should Give the Parameters of the Review,
Along With the Recommendations

An FCPA compliance monitor‘s initial written report should detail the
scope of the review, the monitor‘s evaluation of the company‘s compliance
program, and any recommended enhancements to the compliance program.
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In terms of scope, it is important that the company and the U.S. regulators
understand not only the areas of the company (geographic and otherwise)
on which the monitor concentrates, but the monitor‘s methodology as well.
For instance, if the monitor wishes to engage an external auditor to assist
him or her in conducting tests, studies, or analyses of key controls, he or
she should use the work plan and then the report to explain the reason for
this (and why it is necessary to use an external auditor, instead of in-house
resources). When detailing the monitor‘s evaluation, the report should
catalogue all of the work that the monitor and his or her team performed
and explain why this work was sufficient to gain the information needed to
arrive at substantive conclusions. In light of this, it is important that,
during fieldwork, the monitor‘s team carefully documents all of its
activities. Among the review metrics that this portion of the initial report
should provide are the number of employees interviewed and their
corresponding functions and levels, the number and nature of the site visits
conducted, and any past or external work relied upon to reach conclusions
(like past compliance evaluations, anti-bribery risk assessments, or auditor
reports). Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the initial report must
provide the recommendations. The recommendations are the only
mandatory action items for the company that spring from the report.
Therefore, in addition to vetting all recommendations fully in advance with
the company (and allotting time in the work plan to do so), the monitor
should present in the text of the report a sufficient evidentiary basis for
each recommendation. The monitor should seek the utmost clarity in
explaining the contours of, rationale for, and evidence supporting a set of
concrete, specific, and implementable recommendations.
E.

Cooperation Is Vital

Finally, the monitor must strive whenever possible to have a
cooperative—not an adversarial—relationship with the company. The goal
should be to add real value to the organization by enhancing its compliance
program. To achieve this goal, the monitor must ensure that the company,
including the board of directors and senior management, supports the
monitor‘s work. In addition, the monitor should identify an individual or
committee with knowledge of the corporation‘s compliance policies and
procedures to serve as the monitor‘s primary point of contact and to assist
with each review. The goal should be no surprises for either the monitor or
the company, so constant communication is imperative and should include
iterative work plans, planning meetings prior to any substantive work, and
mid-review meetings, to name a few.
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SOME GUIDANCE FOR COMPANIES FACING AN FCPA MONITORSHIP

After exploring thoroughly the nature of FCPA monitorships and
offering some advice on how they can work better, this article concludes
with some guidance for companies that face an FCPA monitor. As
discussed in the introduction, there are few punishments that companies
dislike more than a monitor. The monitor is an uninvited guest who almost
always outstays his or her welcome, but as with typical in-laws, the
company must continue to welcome the monitor and his or her annual raft
of recommendations with open arms. What follows are some tips on how a
company can minimize the pain of this experience and realize greater value
from the monitorship process.
A.

Carefully Negotiate the Terms of the Settlement Agreement

As discussed above, a monitor acts in accordance with the settlement
agreement between the government and the company. Before the company
even begins to consider the process of selecting an FCPA compliance
monitor, it must focus on negotiating the best agreement possible with,
hopefully, the least onerous burdens as are feasible to help ensure
compliance with the FCPA. Many FCPA settlement agreements contain
inconsistencies and imprecise language that could permit a monitor to
make unreasonable demands. The company must read, analyze, and
negotiate each sentence of the settlement agreement extremely carefully.
During this scrubbing process, it should insert clarifying text wherever
possible.
One area where companies have negotiated different wording is in the
certification required of the monitor during the follow-up reviews. Small
changes can make a big difference in the obligations imposed on the
monitor and, ultimately, the inconvenience and cost inuring to the
company. Like most FCPA settlements, the terms of Statoil‘s monitor
requirement provide that during each of his follow-up reviews, Statoil‘s
monitor must ―certify whether Statoil‘s anti-bribery compliance program,
including its policies and procedures, is appropriately designed and
implemented to ensure compliance with the FCPA.‖184 The requirement
that Statoil‘s policies and procedures ensure compliance with the FCPA is
in tension with the monitor‘s mandate in the same document. The mandate
is to determine ―whether Statoil‘s policies and procedures are reasonably

184. Statoil Deferred Prosecution Agreement, supra note 152, at 11 (emphasis added);
Cease-and-Desist Order, Statoil, Exchange Act Release No. 54599 (Oct. 13, 2006),
available at www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/2006/34-54599.pdf (emphasis added)
[hereinafter Statoil Cease-and-Desist Order].
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designed to detect and prevent violations of the FCPA.‖185 The concept that
an effective program inevitably involves the detection of violations
implicitly acknowledges that no compliance program, even the most
effective ever created, is airtight. This is an unassailable contention, as
large multinational companies will inevitably have employees who
intentionally circumvent internal controls or worse. Therefore, the
existence of the word ―ensure,‖ which connotes total security, complicates
the duty of the monitor and will almost certainly lead to a more exacting
review.
In its global FCPA settlement, Siemens headed off this problem. The
certification mandate for the monitor mirrors his actual review mandate: he
must ―certify whether the compliance program of Siemens, including its
policies and procedures, is reasonably designed and implemented to detect
and prevent violations within Siemens of the anti-corruption laws.‖186 This
simple change comforts the monitor since the program need only be
calibrated to the level of corruption risk facing the entity and not to an
ultimately quixotic level of anti-bribery compliance. In doing so, it may
save the company millions of dollars in monitor‘s fees and internal costs to
implement additional controls.
Indeed, the Siemens settlement featured a number of deviations from
the standard FCPA monitorship mandate. Notably, it provided that the
monitor‘s review did not need to be comprehensive: ―The Monitor is not
expected to conduct a comprehensive review of all business lines, all
business activities or all markets.‖187 Undoubtedly, Siemens was concerned
that its monitorship would involve probes of all of its countless business
lines and geographically ubiquitous operations. It included this language to
guard against just such abuses. Likewise, other companies facing FCPA
monitorships should consider how their monitor could spin out of control,
identify the aspects of the business he or she may find particularly vexing,
as well as the compliance risks that are likely to become an unwarranted
focus, and try to guard against such problems by inserting appropriate
185. Id.
186. Siemens Final Judgment, supra note 94, at 10-11; Statement of Offense at
Attachment 2, ¶ 6, United States v. Siemens Aktiengesellschaft, No. 08-367 (D.D.C. 2008),
available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/documents/siemens-ag-stmt-offense.pdf [hereinafter
Siemens Statement of Offense].
187. Siemens Final Judgment, supra note 94, at 7-8; Siemens Statement of Offense,
supra note 186, at Attachment 2 at ¶ 3. See also Siemens Consent, supra note 94, at 5-6
(―The Monitor‘s work plan for the initial review shall include such steps as are reasonably
necessary to conduct an effective initial review in accordance with the mandate . . . to the
extent the Monitor deems appropriate . . . .‖).
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language in the settlement documents. Among the explicit parameters all
settlement agreements should feature are clear deadlines for annual reviews
and reporting, adoption of recommendations, and completion of the
monitorship. The timelines for performing certain tasks are one of the key
ways to hem in costs and guard against abuses. Of course, it is vital that
the relevant language be identical for both the DOJ and SEC agreements if
the company settles with both agencies. Indeed, all settlement documents
should contain substantively identical descriptions of the company‘s
responsibilities and the monitor‘s role. Differences can only foment
confusion.
When focusing on timelines and obligations, companies should not
neglect their own duties. One area of confusion in some FCPA settlements
is whether the company must ―implement‖ or ―adopt‖ the monitor‘s
recommendations within 120 days. The standard settlement agreement
discusses ―the time period for implementation‖ of the monitor‘s
recommendations, while also noting that the company must ―adopt all
recommendations in the report.‖188 Clearly, an organization can formally
adopt a particular reform long before it implements it globally. In fact,
most multinationals will find 120 days an alarmingly short time period to
roll out any significant changes.189 Unless companies are extremely careful
in negotiating with the government for the right words in their settlement
agreements, they can face significant burdens during the monitorship.
Other thorny areas that should be clearly addressed in the settlement
agreements include the reporting obligations if the monitor uncovers
potentially illegal conduct or encounters intentionally uncooperative
employees.
Finally, the settlement agreements provide an opportunity for the
company to try to limit the expenses incurred during the monitorship. A
number of innovations are potentially available to the settling entity. Most
usefully, it can try to obtain a provision allowing for a sunset of the
monitorship under certain conditions. Nothing will save as much money as
simply having the monitorship terminate early.
The Morford
Memorandum stated that ―in most cases, an agreement should provide for
early termination if the corporation can demonstrate to the government that
there exists a change in circumstances sufficient to eliminate the need for a
monitor.‖190 Accordingly, most post-Morford Memorandum settlement

188. Siemens Final Judgment, supra note 94, at 14; York Int‘l Deferred Prosecution
Agreement, supra note 141, at 13-14; Statoil Deferred Prosecution Agreement, supra note
152, at 10-11; see also Control Components Plea Agreement, supra note 153 (stating that all
recommendations must be adopted).
189. To avoid further complicating this challenge, it is helpful to map out the various
holidays and corporate priorities that could complicate implementation.
190. Morford Memo, supra note 28.
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agreements include a sunset provision, including those of Willbros,191
KBR,192 AGA Medical,193 Siemens,194 and Daimler.195 Companies also
should try to negotiate agreements that rely on the company‘s own internal
resources for some of the analyses, studies, and testing. This is another
area where the Siemens settlement provides a good example: ―[T]he
Monitor is encouraged to coordinate with Siemens personnel including
auditors and compliance personnel and, to the extent the Monitor deems
appropriate, he or she may rely on Siemens processes, on the results of
studies, reviews, audits and analyses conducted by or on behalf of Siemens
and on sampling and testing methodologies.‖196 Additionally, although it
may prove a difficult negotiation point, if the alleged misconduct was
limited in scope, the company could attempt to negotiate an agreement
where the monitor only oversees the rogue business unit, or at the very
least, to have the monitor concentrate primarily on the main area or areas
that caused the underlying violations.
Although it is tempting to focus on the dollar figures associated with
the settlement and the need for the organization to move forward and put
the criminal matter behind it, it is important to negotiate the terms of the
settlement agreement very carefully and make sure that the company‘s
three-year guest has clear ground rules under which to operate.

191. See Willbros Deferred Prosecution Agreement, supra note 105, at 3 (―Conversely,
in the event the Department finds, in its sole discretion, that there exists a change in
circumstances sufficient to eliminate the need for the Monitor, the term of the Agreement
may be terminated early.‖).
192. See Kellogg Brown & Root Plea Agreement, supra note 138, at Exhibit 2 at 6
(―[T]he Monitor may apply to the Department for permission to forego the second follow-up
review.‖).
193. Deferred Prosecution Agreement, United States v. AGA Medical Corp., No. 0:08cr-00172 (D. Minn. June 3, 2008) available at http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/
cases/docs/06-03-08aga-agree.pdf (―Conversely, in the event the Department finds, in its
sole discretion, that there exists a change in circumstances . . . the Term of the Agreement
may be terminated early.‖).
194. Siemens Final Judgment, supra note 94, at 10 (―[T]he Monitor may apply to the
Commission staff for permission to forego the third follow-up review.‖).
195. Daimler Deferred Prosecution Agreement, supra note 5 (―Conversely, in the event
the Department finds, in its sole discretion, that there exists a change in circumstances . . .
the Term of the Agreement may be terminated early.‖).
196. Siemens Consent, supra note 94, at 5-6; Siemens Final Judgment, supra, note 94, at
7-8; Siemens Statement of Offense, supra note 186, Attachment 2, ¶ 3. See also Technip
Deferred Prosecution Agreement, supra note 122 (requiring terms that rely on company‘s
internal resources in a deferred prosecution agreement); Control Components Plea
Agreement, supra note 153 (outlining terms that utilize existing resources in a plea
agreement).
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Selection of a Monitor

Generally, the company must select a monitor who is acceptable to the
government.197 As discussed above, the government will ultimately play an
active role in this selection process—a reality that BAES experienced first
hand. Indeed, for this reason, the company should communicate constantly
with the government during the process, so that the prosecutors understand
the company‘s methodology and its good faith in selecting the most
effective and efficient monitor. The monitor selection process is yet
another area where the company needs to exercise the utmost caution and
perform extensive due diligence. Remember that even well-crafted
settlement agreements will still surely grant the FCPA monitor a great deal
of control over the company. If a monitor becomes abusive, runs up
massive fees, or exceeds his or her mandate, the corporation may be stuck
in an unproductive and costly relationship. Ultimately, a handful of key
characteristics should serve as the central points of inquiry in selecting the
monitor. These include the FCPA background of the prospective monitor,
his or her experience with similarly situated companies, and his or her view
of the role of an FCPA monitor.
1.

FCPA Background

Possibly nothing is more important than the background and
reputation of the prospective FCPA monitor. The company should contact
as many clients and practitioners as possible to develop a clear picture of
how the particular candidate behaves professionally. As an obvious
prerequisite, the monitor and his or her firm must have a large, dynamic
FCPA practice. This is important for a number of reasons. First, the
company does not want the monitor and his or her colleagues to be
developing an understanding of the FCPA or best practices relating to
internal controls and compliance policies during the monitorship. They
should know all of this already, so that the company pays only for the
actual analysis of its own systems.
Ideally, the monitor and his team will also have substantive experience
with FCPA monitorships, either in the role of monitor or counsel to a
197. See, e.g., Control Components Plea Agreement, supra note 153, at 14 (―The
Department retains the right, in its sole discretion, to accept or reject any Monitor proposed
by CCI pursuant to the Agreement.‖); Faro Techs. Cease-and-Desist Order, supra note 100,
at 5 (―Retain . . . an independent consultant . . . not unacceptable to the staff of the‖ SEC.);
Cease-and-Desist Order at 5, Delta & Pine Land Co. and Turk Deltapine, Inc., Exchange
Act Release No. 56138, Accounting and Auditing Enforcement Release No. 2658 (July 26,
2007) available at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/2007/34-56138.pdf (―Retain,
through Delta & Pine‘s Board of Directors, within 60 days after the entry of this order, an
independent consultant . . . not unacceptable to the staff of the Commission.‖).
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company that has had an FCPA monitor. As with most lawyers‘
professional conduct generally, the past tends to be prologue. If the
monitor was abusive in his last engagement, he will probably be abusive in
future monitorships.
Deep experience with a wide variety of clients and in a number of
different settings will also make it more likely that the monitor will take a
measured, balanced view of what an effective compliance program looks
like. It is essential that the monitor appreciate the complexities of
multinational organizations and the compliance challenges that attend
them. A panicky monitor who sees conspiracies and massive failures of
corporate culture behind every isolated incident can cause unwarranted
headaches for the company.
Quite candidly, it is also important that the monitor have other clients
and obligations. The open-ended nature of the FCPA compliance
monitorship can tempt an unethical monitor to expend vast amounts of time
and effort inefficiently peering into every corner of the corporation, rather
than utilizing a risk-based methodology that applies appropriate sampling.
If the monitor has clients and other commitments demanding his or her
time, the chances of such abuse decline dramatically. Further, a monitor
with a large and active private practice needs to worry about his or her
professional reputation. Behavior on the part of the monitor that the
company sees as abusive will not stay private forever—as Attorney
General John Ashcroft‘s experience showed—and repeat players are less
likely to overstep their bounds.
Importantly, all of these attributes should extend to the monitor‘s
team. The company should request in advance a description of the
backgrounds of the foot soldiers who will likely execute the lion‘s share of
the fieldwork for the monitor. They should share these aforementioned
qualities, as it does little good for an experienced FCPA practitioner to be
surrounded by novices who will undoubtedly flounder during the early
stages of the monitorship and expend unreasonable amounts of time on
basic tasks.
2.

Experience with Similarly Situated Companies

Just as he or she must be an FCPA expert, the monitor also should
have a background working with companies like the one receiving the
monitor. It is important for any lawyer to understand the business of his or
her corporate client, but the relevance of this element of an effective legal
representation is significantly amplified in the monitorship context. For the
monitor to be effective, he or she must develop a thorough understanding
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of the company‘s global business and that business‘s inherent exposure to
corruption risk, as well as the systems and procedures that govern it. It is
rare that lawyers in private practice need to develop such a comprehensive
view of a corporation‘s business model and practices. This job will be
much easier if the monitor and his team already have similar clients. The
flatter the learning curve, the more focused and effective the monitorship,
and the lower the costs.
3.

View of the Monitorship

There is no reason why, in the course of interviewing a prospective
monitor, the company cannot ask pointed questions about how the monitor
sees his or her role. The company will want to listen for assurances that he
or she will religiously adhere to the terms of the settlement agreements,
constantly communicate with the company about findings and possible
recommendations, maintain the utmost efficiency in the conduct of
fieldwork, and operate cooperatively with the company as much as
possible. This is the same point at which the corporation should request
from the candidate a detailed budget for the monitorship‘s initial review, as
discussed below. Any reluctance on the part of the candidate to make these
assurances or to disclose his or her vision for the tasks at hand should be
considered a significant red flag.
4.

Personal Characteristics

Finally, it is important not to discount the rapport the leaders of the
company feel they have with the prospective monitor. The best
monitorships involve cooperation and communication—both of which are
easier if the people involved simply get along. The company will want to
avoid candidates who appear abrasive, imperious, or solipsistic. Beyond
the monitor himself or herself, those tendencies can be magnified by the
members of the monitorship team, who will undoubtedly reflect the tone at
the top in the manner in which they interact with the organization. Of
course, it is best if the company can confirm its perception of those
personal characteristics by talking to clients and professional contacts of
the prospective monitor.
C.

Managing the Monitor

Having touched on monitor selection, the discussion now turns to
managing the monitor that the company selects. This section provides
some tips for ensuring that the company‘s FCPA monitorship is as effective
and efficient as possible.
Importantly, the first recommendation,
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concerning the usefulness of obtaining a detailed annual budget, should
initially occur before the selection of any monitor. These measures serve as
vehicles for the company to increase the transparency and efficiency of the
monitor‘s fieldwork.
1.

Obtaining a Detailed Budget

It is very difficult to limit the cost of a monitorship. Some monitors
will claim that any attempt at budgeting or capping fees will undermine
their independence. But a monitorship is different from an investigation or
litigation—it is very predictable. Like an auditor, the monitor should be
able to provide a detailed budget that reflects his or her vision for the
engagement.
In advance of selecting the monitor, the company should obtain a
budget that will be complied with absent unusual or changed
circumstances. The candidate‘s budget should show projected attorney
time spent on the key activities of the monitorship, including reviewing
documents and preparing for, conducting, and documenting meetings and
interviews. The budget should also estimate the cost of producing the
initial report. If possible, the company could also ask the monitor to
project fees and expenses beyond the first year of the monitorship, although
this may be more difficult.
Once the monitorship begins, the company should request periodic
updates from the monitor on the current level of fees and whether he or she
is on budget. This will allow it to raise potential cost overruns with the
monitor immediately and prevent surprises about the cost of particular
tasks. If certain tasks are unreasonably expensive, the company can work
with the monitor to reduce their cost. In additional to providing the
company with a window on the monitor‘s activities, the budgetary process
will force the monitor and his team to consider the cost of their activities
and adjust accordingly. The goal here, like much of monitor management,
is to prevent the engagement from becoming the proverbial ―gravy train.‖
2.

Obtaining a Detailed Timeline

A detailed timeline is also important for controlling costs. By pegging
a timeline to the budget, the company and the monitor can better manage
costs and increase transparency. The timeline will also allow the company
to prepare for the monitorship better and help ensure that there are no
surprises.
An initial proposed timeline from the monitor candidate should show
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when he or she will do the following:
 Meet with company employees in advance of the
fieldwork to learn about the business, its corruption risk
assessments, and its compliance program;


Conduct fieldwork at relevant company locations—the
approximate number of interviews and the amount of
time on the ground;



Review relevant documents (both the amount and type of
documents);



Write the report;



Present findings from the report to the relevant
government agencies; and



Prepare for each follow-up review (and, ideally, how the
follow-up reviews will differ from the initial review).

Like the budget, the timeline will serve the dual role of providing
transparency regarding the process, while disciplining the monitor and his
or her team.
3.

Establish a Single Point of Contact

Few things are more important to ensuring a positive experience with
a company‘s FCPA monitor than having a single point of contact, a
company official or office that can speak for the organization being
monitored. And ultimately, the company needs to have one person who
can speak authoritatively for it and represent its interests in the monitorship
process. This is harder than it sounds, as the monitor will undoubtedly
have contact with a wide range of company stakeholders, including
members of the board. For this reason, it is important that everyone
understand at the beginning of the process who will speak for the
organization (usually the general counsel or a senior legal official) and
monitor the engagement. It is vital that the monitor not have back channels
to other senior officials in the company, who may not be as savvy about the
process or understand exactly what the monitor is doing. Finally, whoever
the contact person is must have sufficient authority to aid the monitor in the
review and recommendation implementation process. In particular,
regional leaders should not feel free to disregard directives about
cooperating with the monitor. Such a strong central point of contact,
therefore, also benefits the monitor by serving as a reliable partner and aid
in the entire process.
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Marshall Internal Resources to Assist the Monitor

No corporation subject to an FCPA compliance monitor should expect
the process to be a painless or inexpensive experience. In light of the
various inconveniences and the overall cost, companies may be tempted to
provide minimal resources for the monitor to utilize. Often, this can be a
huge mistake. By not supporting the monitor, the company risks that the
monitor deploys his or her own resources or hires outside vendors to do
what the company is not doing. In fact, by putting significant resources
and information at the monitor‘s disposal at the beginning of the process,
the company might very well save money.
Most obviously, the company should provide upfront for the monitor a
complete description of the nature of its past violative conduct, the
subsequent remedial actions, and the current state of its FCPA compliance
program. The organization should have all of this information at its
fingertips; there is no reason to make the monitor expend countless billable
hours developing this factual basis for the initial review. Additionally, the
corporation should give the monitorship team a reasonably detailed
overview of its business and operations. As discussed above, without
knowing the business, the monitor cannot possibly assess the company‘s
anti-bribery policies and procedures. It may be a significant and
unnecessary cost for the monitor to develop an understanding of the
business through fieldwork.
The company should also consider assigning its employees to the
monitorship team for each review period. Having employees working
under the direction of the monitor will almost always be significantly
cheaper than paying the hourly rates of a legal, consulting, or forensic
auditing professional. Further, company employees will know the
organization better than an outside vendor. They can help give the monitor
confidence that the review does not have any significant blind spots. Some
FCPA monitors have found it particularly efficient to utilize the resources
of internal audit, as those employees often conduct reviews similar to what
the monitor is performing.
5.

Preview the Report and Recommendations

Finally, it is entirely reasonable for the company to request access to
the monitor‘s report and recommendations in advance of the U.S.
authorities. This is good for the monitor and for the company. It is good
for the company because it ensures that the report will not be a total
surprise upon submission, and more importantly, the preview will allow the
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corporation to correct any errors in the monitor‘s report. It is also a chance
to vet the monitor‘s recommendations with internal stakeholders at the
company and determine their feasibility. If they can be changed slightly in
advance to make implementation easier, they should be. For the monitor,
what is most helpful about this advance review is the company‘s
opportunity to correct factual errors. Nothing could be more embarrassing
to a responsible monitor than to have his or her work corrected by the
corporation in front of the U.S. regulators. And ultimately, there is no
reason why either the U.S. government or the monitor should fear the
company having an opportunity to comment on the monitor‘s work in
advance.
D.

Preventing Others from Exploiting the Monitorship Relationship

One final consideration for an organization facing the imposition of an
FCPA monitor is how to help prevent outside parties from utilizing the
monitor‘s work for their own benefit—most likely, securities plaintiffs
seeking to exploit the monitor‘s fieldwork. The monitor‘s work makes two
categories of information vulnerable to discovery. First, the monitor, as an
independent outside party with whom the company does not have an
attorney-client relationship, may risk waiving privilege on internal
company materials. In particular, it is likely that the monitor will need to
review some internal investigation reports drafted by or at the direction of
company counsel. This may render these materials discoverable in a civil
lawsuit. Second, it is possible that the monitorship process itself will
identify and document information that could aid in a lawsuit.
The company should work with the monitor to minimize both of these
risks, as they will undermine the monitorship, in addition to hurting the
company. At the very least, the company should include a privilege nonwaiver agreement as part of the monitor‘s retention agreement to try to
prevent otherwise privileged information from becoming discoverable.
The language of such an agreement may read as follows:
In the event that any third party seeks disclosure of materials that
may be protected by the attorney-client privilege or work product
doctrine, pursuant to court order or otherwise, the monitor shall
(a) notify the company and make all reasonable efforts to allow
the company to resist such disclosure on the basis that the
materials are protected by the attorney-client privilege, and/or
work product doctrine, or similar protective doctrine, and
(b) support the company‘s position. The monitor may disclose
the materials pursuant to a protective order if disclosure is
required by court order.
It is unclear, however, whether a court would view any applicable
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privilege as preserved. Some courts have recognized the doctrine of
―limited waiver‖ when a company provides information as part of
cooperation with a governmental investigation.198 These courts consider
the privilege waived only as to the government entity or agent that receives
the privileged information; the company can continue to assert attorneyclient privilege if an outside party attempts to obtain the information. The
majority of courts, however, do not accept the concept of limited waiver.
In fact, in 2006 one federal court observed that ―every appellate court that
ha[d] considered the issue in the last twenty-five years‖ had held that a
company and its attorneys could not ―waive the attorney-client privilege
selectively.‖199
But a recent D.C. Circuit ruling could provide some independent basis
for enforcing a non-waiver of privilege agreement. The court held that
when a corporation provides attorney work product regarding anticipated
litigation with the IRS to its auditors in connection with the audit of the
company‘s financial statements, it does not waive the work product
protection.200 The court explained that, even though the auditors were an
independent party—much like a monitor—disclosure to them was not a
waiver because the auditors were not an adversary of the company.201 The
198. See Diversified Industries, Inc. v. Meredith, 572 F.2d 596, 611 (8th Cir. 1978) (en
banc) (determining that a limited waiver of the attorney-client privilege occurred, because
the corporation voluntarily surrendered material protected by the privilege in the context of
a separate and nonpublic investigation by the SEC); see, e.g., In re Target Tech Co., LLC,
208 F. App‘x 825, 827 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (finding waiver based on an extrajudicial disclosure
that revealed the attorney‘s conclusion, but did not reveal the details of the privileged
communication, and stating that when ordering production in light of the waiver, the court
should ensure that its order is limited to the subject matter of the disclosure); Bittaker v.
Woodford, 331 F.3d 715, 728 (9th Cir. 2003) (stating that a district court must enter
appropriate orders clearly delineating the contours of the limited waiver before the
commencement of discovery, and strictly police those limits thereafter); In re Woolworth
Corp. Sec. Class Action Litig., 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7773, *7 (S.D.N.Y. June 7, 1996)
(―A finding that publication of an internal investigative report constitutes waiver might well
discourage corporations from taking the responsible step of employing outside counsel to
conduct an investigation when wrongdoing is suspected.‖).
199. See United States v. Reyes, 239 F.R.D. 591, 603 (N.D. Cal. 2006) (rejecting the
concept of limited waiver); see, e.g., Ratliff v. Davis Polk & Wardell, 354 F.3d 165, 170 n.5
(2d Cir. 2003) (―This court has previously rejected a ‗limited waiver‘ rule that would
preserve attorney-client privilege even after documents had been disclosed to a third party,
such as the SEC.‖ (quoting In re John Doe Corp., 675 F.2d 482, 489 (2d. Cir. 1982))); In re
Columbia/HCA Healthcare Corp. Billing Practices Litig., 293 F.3d 289, 302 (6th Cir. 2002)
(rejecting the concept of limited waiver in all forms and collecting cases discussing limited
waiver).
200. United States v. Deloitte, LLP, 610 F.3d 129, 139 (D.C. Cir. 2010).
201. Id. at 140.
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court relied in part on the fact that the company had a reasonable
expectation of privacy in light of the auditor‘s duty of confidentiality under
American Institute of Certified Public Accountants‘ rules.202 In doing so,
the court extended work product protection to a document authored by the
audit team recording statements of counsel that reflected their work
product.203 It rejected arguments by the IRS that the auditors‘ duty to issue
a report meant that the company had waived workproduct protection.
Using this logic, companies could attempt to include a confidentiality
agreement in their retention agreements with the monitor and then ask
courts to apply the same reasoning whenever faced with a discovery
request.
One other possibility for avoiding waiver could be to seek a court
order under Federal Rule of Evidence 502(d):
A federal court order that the attorney-client privilege or work
product protection is not waived as a result of disclosure in
connection with the litigation pending before the court governs
all persons or entities in all state or federal proceedings, whether
or not they were parties to the matter before the court, if the order
incorporates the agreement of the parties before the court.204
If the monitorship is pursuant to a DPA, it seems that Rule 502(d) may
apply if the judge were willing to issue a court order mandating that
information disclosed to the monitor or his or her team in the course of the
monitorship does not waive privilege.
As tricky as it may be to avoid having the monitorship waive privilege
or work product protection, it may be even harder to avoid discovery of the
monitor‘s work that is not otherwise protected. Presumably, a party suing
the company could subpoena the monitor‘s non-privileged work product. It
is largely unclear what a company may do to protect these types of
documents, but there is some case law that could be used to cobble together
a protection.
Indeed, then-district court Judge Patrick Higginbotham may have
provided some basis for synthesizing such a privilege in his In re LTV
Securities Litigation opinion.205 That case featured a court-appointed
Special Officer, who serves a role quite similar to that of a monitor. The
court explained:
There are important differences between the role of the Special
Officer and that of the ordinary counsel. Unlike the situation
typically presented where counsel has been hired in anticipation
of civil or criminal liability, . . . the Special Officer here was
202.
203.
204.
205.

Id. at 142.
Id. at 139.
FED. R. EVID. 502(d).
In re LTV Securities Litigation, 89 F.R.D. 595 (N.D. Tex. 1981).
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retained by LTV to implement an SEC consent decree.
Atypically, LTV, the ―client,‖ is not the final arbiter of the
Special Officer‘s duties, functions or authority. That power is
held by the court, which may resolve any disagreement between
LTV and the Special Officer concerning his duties, functions or
authority. The Final Judgment identifies certain duties owed to
the Special Officer. LTV must ―cooperate fully‖ with the Special
Officer, may not assert against the Special Officer any corporate
privilege except as to matters prepared for or by LTV in the
course of the SEC investigation, and must authorize the directors,
officers, employees and agents of LTV to testify under oath and
provide all requested information.206
Additionally, the court noted that ―the Special Officer has obligations
toward the SEC that may conflict with the normal duties owed a client by
private counsel.‖207 It was also stated that, ―[a]t the Commission‘s
discretion, [the Special Officer] must furnish the SEC any documents,
statements or other information in his possession as well as reports or
recommendations he prepares prior to submitting them to LTV.‖208 Thus,
the district court observed that ―the Special Officer is more akin to a public
official than privately retained counsel,‖ and in its hybrid role of
―government investigator and privately retained counsel,‖ ―the sphere of
confidentiality which the Special Officer might expect to enjoy is a
synthesis of the privileges available to his ‗clients‘ were he serving in the
roles of government investigator or private investigatory counsel.‖209
The district court first concluded that ―if the Special Officer were
privately retained counsel, the information he is now gathering would be
protected from all discovery unless supported by good cause.‖210 It then
went on to explain that ―[t]he SEC has indicated that this investigation, if
conducted by SEC employees, is the type of investigation ordinarily
considered confidential under the Commission‘s regulations.‖211 The court
noted that the information collected would not likely be discoverable
through a FOIA request.212 Finally, the court considered the ―immediate
adverse impact on the ongoing investigation‖ that the discovery request
would have and weighed the ―long-term effect of permitting this type of
206.
207.
208.
209.
210.
211.
212.

Id. at 614.
Id. at 614-15.
Id. at 615.
Id.
Id. at 616.
Id. at 617.
Id.
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discovery,‖ as ―the SEC will seek to negotiate [similar] consent decrees.‖213
It contended:
If such discovery is permitted, a corporation concerned about its
exposure to civil liability would be more willing to risk SEC
investigation, particularly in light of the exemption from public
disclosure generally afforded the Commission‘s investigatory
records. Allowing the type of discovery requested here may kill
the goose that lays the golden egg – the Commission may be
deprived of a useful enforcement option, while shareholders will
hardly be benefited by inhibiting corporate self-investigation.214
It was observed that ―[t]he SEC simply cannot staff individual cases
with lawyers of [the Special Officer‘s] experience, skill and support
facilities; at least not without great risk of misallocation of its resources.‖215
Thus, the district court opined that there existed a privilege—unique from
but derivative of the attorney-client privilege and work product doctrine—
that ―sets a standard of protection akin to that of work-product under Rule
26(b).‖216
Although the facts of the LTV case and those presented when a
monitor is retained by a company are similar, key differences remain that
make it difficult to predict whether an analogous privilege could apply to
monitorships. First, as noted above, there is no attorney-client relationship
between the company and monitor. The LTV opinion did not indicate
whether the existence of an attorney-client relationship was explicitly
foreclosed in that matter, as it is in almost all settlement agreements that
require the retention of a monitor. Additionally, in LTV, the Special
Officer had discretion under the Final Judgment to request that the SEC
keep the Special Officer‘s report confidential, and the Special Officer‘s
retention agreement required him to do so.217 But for many monitorship
213. Id. at 619.
214. Id.
215. Id.
216. Id. at 622. See also United States v. Alex. Brown & Sons, Inc., 963 F. Supp. 235
(S.D.N.Y. 1997) (applying LTV ruling to non-disclosure provision of consent decree).
217. Id. at 615. See also United States v. MIT, 129 F.3d 681, 683 (1st Cir. 1997) (noting
that, in declining to apply the Diversified ruling, there was ―no unconditional promise to
keep the [disclosed] documents secret‖); In re Sealed Case, 676 F.2d 793, 824-25 (D.C. Cir.
1982) (finding no error in district court ruling ordering disclosure where no confidentiality
agreement existed); In re Leslie Fay Cos. Sec. Litig., 161 F.R.D. 274, 284 (S.D.N.Y. 1995)
(holding that, where U.S. Attorney ―agreed to hold all materials produced . . . in
confidence,‖ no waiver of attorney-client privilege occurred); Enron Corp. v. Borget, 1990
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12471, *2 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 22, 1990) (―In making its submission to the
SEC, Enron specifically reserved all applicable legal privileges and rejected any implication
of waiver from their submission.‖); SEC v. Amster & Co., 126 F.R.D. 28, 29-30 (S.D.N.Y.
1989) (stating that privilege was not waived even though there had been an agreement with
the SEC to maintain the confidentiality of disclosed documents).
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agreements, the applicable confidentiality provision is limited in scope and
only applies to the monitor, not to the government.218
Despite these meaningful differences, there exist good arguments—
based on public policy concerns and derived from the limited waiver cases,
the D.C. Circuit‘s ruling, and Judge Higginbotham‘s LTV opinion—that a
company can advance in an attempt to protect the monitor‘s work product.
First, permitting third-party discovery punishes corporate offenders
for entering into FCPA settlements with the SEC and DOJ. Courts should
encourage such agreements rather than force companies to fight
investigations, taxing judicial and agency resources while hindering
enforcement and remedial action.
Second, the monitor can assert that he or she is really acting as an
adjunct to a governmental investigation, not as private counsel. In this
capacity, the monitor and his or her team should enjoy protections similar
to those of federal investigators.
Third, any discovery requests contemporaneous with the monitor‘s
activities will hinder the monitor‘s ongoing efforts by siphoning human and
financial resources dedicated to monitoring the company.
While these are valid arguments in favor of denying a discovery
request and granting some sort of privilege, in the absence of either a
confidentiality agreement with the government or an attorney-client
relationship between the company and the monitor, any claims of privilege
are unlikely to succeed. In addition, the case law is far from consistent
across all circuits on whether this type of privilege may be asserted. It is
therefore advisable that all parties proceed as if resisting discovery requests
will fail in the end.
VI. CONCLUSION
Ultimately, irrespective of how companies view FCPA monitorships,
they are, by all indications, here to stay. It therefore behooves corporations
facing an FCPA enforcement action, the FCPA enforcers at the SEC and
DOJ, and monitors themselves to understand the recent history of FCPA
monitorships and consider how they can work better. As the U.S.
218. See Statoil Deferred Prosecution Agreement, supra 152, at ¶ 12 (―[T]he Compliance
Consultant shall agree to maintain the confidentiality of Statoil‘s trade secrets and other
confidential business information in conformity with Norwegian law, and to give due
consideration to Statoil‘s need for operational flexibility and preservation of business
relationships with third parties, provided that nothing in this paragraph shall preclude the
Compliance Consultant from sharing such confidential information with the Commission
staff and DOJ.‖).
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government‘s FCPA enforcement efforts become more robust, all potential
stakeholders need to weigh carefully when the imposition of a monitor will
lead to a better corporate citizen and when it is more likely to be a
redundant, punitive measure. In situations that may call for an independent
compliance monitor, all participants should seek to maximize the value of
the monitorship and minimize inefficiency. In the final analysis, this will
help reduce the frequency of future FCPA violations and lead to a more
effective enforcement regime.

